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INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND COUNTER
TERRORISM LAWS
CLIVE WALKER*
ABSTRACT
Since terrorism is now perceived as a primary and pervasive threat to
state security, many states have adopted broad legal definitions of “terror-
ism” and, upon that basis, have enacted correspondingly expansive polic-
ing powers and criminal offences.  As a dramatic instance of how these
approaches, which affect major Western jurisdictions such as the U.S. and
U.K., this paper will focus on the paradigm case of David Miranda.  In
August 2013, Miranda was transporting computer materials (including
files from security agencies) supplied by Edward Snowden, a former con-
tractor with the U.S. National Security Agency, to journalist Glenn Green-
wald to assist ongoing disclosures in The Guardian and other
publications.  The materials were seized during an examination and deten-
tion of Miranda while he was transiting through Heathrow Airport.  The
journalists viewed their mission as one of ethical disclosure in the public
interest of a vast web of governmental surveillance programmes.  However,
the U.K. Security Service (MI5) contended that Miranda was involved in
‘terrorism’ (as defined in the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000, section 1) because
his mission sought to influence the government by promoting a political or
ideological cause.  The allegation was that disclosure of the data to a hos-
tile state (Russia), or to terrorists, might imperil the identities of secret
agents or the methods used for electronic surveillance of terrorists.  Thus,
the material fell into the realms of terrorism.  On these grounds, Miranda
was held under special detention powers relating to counter-terrorism at
borders, and the materials were seized.  Similar arguments were then used
to persuade the editor of The Guardian to destroy other materials held in
the newspaper offices.  In a subsequent court review, Miranda v Secretary
of State for the Home Department, the meaning of who qualifies as a ‘ter-
rorist’ and whether the journalistic activity being pursued by Miranda,
Greenwald, and others should be excluded from that depiction was
explored.  This paper seeks to reflect upon the complex linkages between
journalistic activities and the label of ‘terrorism,’ which is becoming a pri-
mary threat to investigative journalism in the contemporary world.  It will
require reflection upon the conceptual nature of terrorism and journalism
in a setting of ethics, public policy, and law.
* Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice Studies, School of Law, University of
Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom, law6cw@leeds.ac.uk.  An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the conference on Freedom of Information, and Governmental Trans-
parency, in the Open Government Era, University Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne, 10 & 11 March
2015, Paris, France.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development and exposure of public policy requires champi-
ons.  Lawyers and politicians may fondly believe that they are the self-
appointed champions, however, journalists have at least an equal claim
to a leadership role.  They may be viewed as unencumbered by the spe-
cial interests of their client or their political allegiance.  More positively,
journalists have a special public interest role to play in informing the
public.
The European Court of Human Rights has long been keen to
underline the press’s role as champions of informing the public about
public policy issues, including with regard to reporting about terrorism.
In Castells v. Spain, it was suggested that:
Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of
discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of
their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the oppor-
tunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public
opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free politi-
cal debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic
society.1
The conferment of a special press role was extended in Jersild v.
Denmark, where the European Court of Human Rights accepted that
“[a]lthough formulated primarily with regard to the print media, these
principles doubtless apply also to the audio-visual media.”2  One may
also find in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
more specific approbation of the role of investigative journalism
through its attraction of an especially high level of protection in princi-
ple, both against claims to the disclosure of sources3 and challenges by
way of libel suit.4
As applied to journalistic coverage of terrorism, the European
Court of Human Rights has considered many applications relating to
the reporting of the statements of terrorists or persons sympathetic to
terrorist causes.  Civil or criminal actions against the media for reports
or discussion of such statements have been closely dissected by the
Court for any sign of the endorsement or encouragement of violence
which will divest the journalist of any protection from free speech rights
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.5  In
1. Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43 (1992).
2. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995).
3. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483; Nordisk Film & TV
A/S v. Denmark, App. No. 40485/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Voskuil v. Netherlands, App.
No. 64752/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Fin. Times Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 821/03
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 38224/03 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2010); Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No.
39315/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
4. See Cumpa˘na˘ & Maza˘re v. Romania, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 63, 96; Mosley v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 129 (2011).
5. See generally CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLA-
TION 39–82 (3d ed. 2014).
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Zana v. Turkey,6 the applicant’s statement of sympathy for the Partiya
Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as the “PKK”)
was regarded as likely to exacerbate an already violent situation and so
was unprotected by Article 10, even though the applicant was a mayor
in the region.  In Gu¨ndu¨z v. Turkey,7 a call upon supporters to produce
“one brave man among the Muslims to plant a dagger in their soft
underbelly and run them through twice with a bayonet” was unpro-
tected, as was a cartoon in praise of the September 11 attacks published
in the Basque country in Leroy v. France.8  Thus,
forms of identification with a terrorist organisation, and especially
apologia for such an organisation, may be regarded as a manifesta-
tion of support for terrorism and an incitement to violence and
hatred.  Similarly, the Court accepts that to disseminate messages
praising the perpetrator of an attack, to denigrate the victims of
an attack, to raise money for terrorist organisations, or to engage
in other similar conduct, may constitute acts of incitement to ter-
rorist violence . . . .9
But where, as in Arslan v. Turkey,10 the Court was sure that the words
used did not constitute an incitement to violence, it defended state-
ments; in this case those in a book, which alleged that the Turkish state
oppressed the Kurds and so, explained the consequent “resistance” and
“Kurdish intifada.”  As made clear in Gerger v. Turkey,11 words such as
“resistance”, “struggle”, and “liberation” do not necessarily constitute
an incitement to violence.  The more neutral reportage of declarations
or interviews of terrorist representatives by media professionals will also
tend to attract the protection of the Court, as established in Su¨rek and
O¨zdemir v. Turkey,12 and latitude is also given to artistic and academic
6. Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. See also Su¨rek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. 353; Su¨rek v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 24735/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999);
Falakaoglu & Saygili v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 22147/02, 24972/03 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2007).
7. Gu¨ndu¨z v. Turkey, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 435, 439.
8. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
9. Gu¨ler & Ug˘ur v. Turkey, App. No. 31706/10, 33088/10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (2014).
10. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 23462/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17 (1999); see also Ceylan v.
Turkey, App. No. 23556/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Erdog˘du v. Turkey, App. No. 25723/94
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
11. Gerger v. Turkey, App. No. 24919/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50 (1999); see also Erdog˘du
and I˙nce v. Turkey, App. No. 25067/94, 25068/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Okc¸uoglu v.
Turkey, App. No. 24246/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Polat v. Turkey, App. No. 23500/94
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
12. O¨zdemir v. Turkey, App. No. 23927/94, 24277/94 Eur. Ct. H.R (1999); see also
Su¨rek v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 24122/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Su¨rek v. Turkey (No.
4), App. No. 24762/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); O¨nal v. Turkey, App. No. 41445/04, 41453/
04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Belek v. Turkey, App. No. 36827/06, 36828/06, 36829/06 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2012); Bayar v. Turkey, App. No. 39690/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014); Bayar and
Gu¨rbu¨z v. Turkey (No.2), App. No. 33037/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015); O¨ner and Tu¨rk v.
Turkey, App. No. 51962/12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015); Belek and Veliog˘lu v. Turkey, App. No.
44227/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015); Mu¨du¨r Duman v. Turkey, App. No.15450/03 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2015).
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speech.13  This European jurisprudence has not stopped several Euro-
pean jurisdictions from enacting criminal offences against the direct or
indirect incitement of terrorism, and other international law standard-
setting encourages these measures.14  An example is section 1 of the
UK’s Terrorism Act 2006,15 which has been upheld as consistent with
Article 10 by the English courts.16
The focus in this paper is not so much on the publication of
reports about terrorism but on investigations into terrorism by journal-
ists in which they seek to bring new, hidden information to the atten-
tion of the public.  Attention was drawn to this theme by the case of
David Miranda in 2013.  Miranda was detained as a suspected terrorist
at Heathrow Airport for the possession of materials supplied from
Edward Snowden, materials being transported from Russia to Brazil for
journalistic purposes.  This episode, which is considered below, raised
an acute dispute as to whether Miranda should primarily be treated as a
journalist or as a terrorist.  However, this paper addresses a wider issue
than the precise circumstances of the Miranda case, namely, how inves-
tigative journalism has been affected by the context of terrorism.  For
these purposes, most attention will be paid to the laws in the United
Kingdom, since that jurisdiction has long been the most active and
influential designer of counter-terrorism legislation.17
The phenomenon of contemporary terrorism works in two ways,
which are inimical to journalism.  First, the stance of terrorists towards
journalists seems to have become much more hostile.  In recent times,
journalists have become targets rather than witnesses or messengers.
One early example of this trend was the killing of Daniel Pearl in Paki-
stan in 2002.18  More recent illustrations of the targeting of journalists
involve the murder of Charlie Hebdo journalists in Paris on 7 January
13. See Bas¸kaya and Okc¸uog˘lu v. Turkey, App. No. 23536/94, 24408/94 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1999); Karatas¸ v. Turkey, App. No. 23168/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
14. See S.C. Res. 1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); Council of Europe, Convention on the Pre-
vention of Terrorism art. 5, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 196; Council Framework Decision
2008/919/JHA, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 21 (EU).
15. See Adrian Hunt, Criminal Prohibitions on Direct and Indirect Encouragement of Ter-
rorism, 2007 CRIM. L. REV. 441 (2007); Ellen Parker, Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act
2006—The Relationship Between Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community
in the United Kingdom Versus the United States, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 711 (2007); Eric
Barendt, Incitement to, and Glorification of, Terrorism, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY
445 (Ivan Hare and James Weinstein eds., 2009); Tufyal Choudhury, The Terrorism Act
2006: Discouraging Terrorism, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, at 463; S. Chehani
Ekaratne, Redundant Restriction: The U.K.’s Offense of Glorifying Terrorism, 23 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 205 (2010); Clive Walker, Militant Speech About Terrorism in a Smart Militant Democ-
racy, 80 MISS. L.J. 1395 (2011). See generally WALKER, supra note 5, at 39–82.
16. R v. Faraz [2012] EWCA (Crim) 2820 (UK); R v. Gul [2013] UKSC 64; Iqbal v. R
[2014] EWCA (Crim) 2650 (UK).
17. See Clive Walker, Terrorism and Criminal Justice: Past, Present and Future, 2004
CRIM. L. REV. 311 (2004); KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERROR-
ISM (2011).
18. Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh was sentenced to death in Hyderabad in 2002.
Rory McCarthy, Underworld where terror and security meet, GUARDIAN (July 16, 2002, 3:30
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/16/pakistan.rorymccarthy; Daniel
McGrory, CIA Paid Pakistan for terror suspects, AUSTRALIAN (Sept. 26, 2006, 12:00 AM),
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201519 and killings by the Islamic State and its affiliates in Syria.20  Rea-
sons for this growing hostility may include not only the vehemence of
the rejection by extreme Islamist groups of modernist cultures, but also,
paradoxically, their embrace of new media technologies.  The internet
affords several advantages to terrorists.  Compared to print media, the
internet is harder to control and restrict, has better cross-jurisdictional
reach, and has lower running costs.21  Furthermore, the Internet means
that terrorists are no longer wholly reliant on the established—and
often Western-controlled—mass media to act as carriers and
intermediaries, thereby allowing them to attain otherwise unattainable
prominence, explicitness, and meaning for their ideology and violent
activities.22  Thus, the internet now presents terrorists, whether mass
movements or lone actors, with increased opportunities to propagate
globally their own interpretations and messages,23 and so jihadis and
their online fans—“jihobbyists”24—increasingly have greater recourse
to mainstream social media platforms.25  For example, Al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula’s online Inspire publication has been viewed as highly
successful.26  Now, Islamic State and their online supporters have
proven themselves to be adept and prolific producers and dissemina-
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/cia-paid-pakistan-for-terror-suspects/
story-e6frg6so-1111112268186.
19. Police et Justice, LE MONDE, http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque-contre-charlie-
hebdo/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
20. Prominent recent examples include the killings of James Foley (2014), Steven
Sotloff (2014), Kenji Goto (2015), and Ruqia Hassan (2015).  For global statistics of kill-
ings of journalists since 1992, see Journalists Killed Since 1992, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNAL-
ISTS, https://www.cpj.org/killed/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
21. Clive Walker & Maura Conway, Online Terrorism and Online Laws, 8 DYNAMICS
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 156 (2015).
22. See SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR: COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 170 (2000).  These media roles sometimes resulted in threats of
prosecution either for withholding information or for “apology” of terrorism. See also
CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW 341–86 (2011).
23. See Maura Conway, Cybercortical Warfare: Hizbollah’s Internet Strategy, in THE
INTERNET AND POLITICS: CITIZENS, VOTERS AND ACTIVISTS 90 (Sarah Oates et al. eds., 2005);
Maura Conway, Terrorist Web Sites: Their Contents, Functioning, and Effectiveness, in MEDIA
AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185 (Philip Seib ed., 2005); Kelly
Damphousse, The Dark Side of the Web: Terrorists’ Use of the Internet, in CRIMES OF THE
INTERNET 573 (Frank Schmalleger & Michael Pittaro eds., 2008); GABRIEL WEIMANN, NEW
TERRORISM AND NEW MEDIA 2 (2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf.
24. JARRET M. BRACHMAN, GLOBAL JIHADISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (2009).  For
Irish Republican internet usages, see Ross Frenett and M.L.R. Smith, IRA 2.0: Continuing
the Long War—Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence, 24 TERRORISM & POL. VIO-
LENCE 375 (2012).  For right-wing groups, see GERMAN FED. OFFICE FOR THE PROT. OF THE
CONSTITUTION, RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS AND THEIR INTERNET PRESENCE (2013).
25. AARON Y. ZELIN, NEW AM. FOUND., THE STATE OF GLOBAL JIHAD ONLINE: A QUALI-
TATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND CROSS-LINGUAL ANALYSIS (2013), http://www.washingtoninsti-
tute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Zelin20130201-NewAmericaFoundation.pdf.
26. See Anthony F. Lemieux et al., Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of Its Signifi-
cance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills
Model, 26 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 354 (2014).
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tors of digital content, especially through their Dabiq bulletins.27  This
growth of online content from terrorist groups and its potential attrac-
tiveness to, and resonance with, discontented “digital natives”—young
people who have grown up with the internet—have become causes of
official apprehension and legislative development throughout
Europe28 and globally.  Therefore, the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2178—addressing the growing issue of foreign terrorist
fighters—“urges Member States, in this context, to act cooperatively
when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting
technology, communications and resources, including audio and video,
to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under
international law.”29
It is dangerous enough to suffer potential attacks from terrorism,
but the particular focus of this paper is directed towards the growing
attacks on journalism from the state in pursuit of counter-terrorism.
This counter-terrorism threat to journalism emerges in the form of a
three-pronged attack.
First, there is the criminalization of journalistic activities by which
the process of obtaining information and distilling it into news stories
becomes depicted as a terrorist threat to the state.  The first part of the
paper considers the prime example of David Miranda.
Second, there is the demand for information generated by the
activities of journalism. In this way, journalism is coerced into serving
state interests, even if contrary to the journalistic ethics on the basis of
which the information was amassed.  This state capture of journalistic
information may involve the more voluntary trading of information
through on-going police-media cooperative relationships, but the inter-
est of this paper lies in more coercive approaches.  These will involve
demands backed by legal sanctions, such as criminal offences or con-
tempt of court, in reaction to police knowledge or suspicions that jour-
nalists possess potentially useful data.
Third, and perhaps most insidious of all, there may arise a demand
for proactive information-giving from the media to the security authori-
ties.  In the United Kingdom, there is, again, an element of criminal
coercion through anti-terrorism laws that is not common elsewhere in
the Western world.  This imposed duty of the media to provide informa-
tion proactively without demand has become broader and shriller.
27. See Haroro J. Ingram, Three Traits of the Islamic State’s Information Warfare, 159
RUSI J. 4 (2014); Jytte Klausen, Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign
Fighters in Syria and Iraq, 38 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1 (2015).
28. See Eur. Consult. Ass., Foreign Fighters and Returnees, Doc. No. 14160/14 (2014);
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combatting
Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combatting Terrorism, at
art. 5, COM (2015) 625 final (Dec. 2, 2015); Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to
the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Oct. 22, 2015,
C.E.T.S. No. 127.
29. U.N. Security Council, Res. 2178, at Art. 17 (Sept. 14, 2014).
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Proactive information transfer is also being encouraged on a more con-
sensual basis, as revealed by Edward Snowden.
Having explored each of these three areas of challenge, the follow-
ing part of the paper will analyse why these trends are occurring.  Sev-
eral suggested causes are mentioned.  Some relate to the nature of
terrorism and counter-terrorism.  Some relate to the nature of the
media.  The analysis will be followed by some conclusions and the
appropriate reactions.
II. CRIMINALISATION OF JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITIES
The criminalisation of journalistic activities arises from the official
apprehension that investigative journalism might pose a threat to state
security.  By way of evidence of current attitudes, it is instructive to refer
to the Joint Services Publication 440, United Kingdom Ministry of
Defence, a restricted security manual devised in 2001 and later revealed
by Wikileaks.30  It lists investigative journalists as a “non-traditional
threat” to security whose activities are to be guarded against in the same
way as foreign intelligence services and subversive or terrorist
organizations.31
This perception is not new.  Several prosecutions have been
mounted against investigative journalists under UK official secrets legis-
lation.32  Prominent examples in the modern era33 have included: R. v.
Cairns, Aitken and Roberts in 1971, concerning a military assessment of
the Biafran war;34 and R. v. Aubrey, Berry and Campbell in 1978, concern-
ing army signals intelligence.35  In a case involving The Guardian36 in
30. UK MoD Manual of Security Volumes 1, 2 and 3 Issue 2, JSP-440, Restricted, 2389
pages, 2001, WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/wiki/UK_MoD_Manual_of_Security_Vol
umes_1,_2_and_3_Issue_2,_JSP-440,_RESTRICTED,_2389_pages,_2001 (last visited Apr.
12, 2016).
31. For the published assessment of security threats, see CABINET OFFICE, CM. 7953,
A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
61936/national-security-strategy.pdf; CABINET OFFICE, CM. 9161, NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW 2015: A SECURE AND PROSPEROUS
UNITED KINGDOM 62 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf (promot-
ing “free media” is an objective rather than a threat).
32. Most were brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 28, § 2
(UK), which was repealed and replaced by the Official Secrets Act 1989, c. 6 (UK). HOME
OFFICE, CMND. 5104, DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS
ACT 1911 (1972); HOME OFFICE, CMND. 7285, REFORM OF SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL
SECRETS ACT 1911 (1978); HOME OFFICE, CM. 408, REFORM OF SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL
SECRETS ACT 1911 (1988).
33. See also R v. Frederick Henry Budgen, TIMES, July 15, 1932, at 4; R v. Frederick Henry
Budgen, TIMES, Aug. 13, 1932, at 5; Joseph Jaconelli, Wills as Public Documents—Privacy and
Property Rights, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 147, 153–54 (2012); COMPTON MACKENZIE, MY LIFE AND
TIMES: OCTAVE SEVEN, 1931–38 (1968).
34. See R. v. Cairns, Aitken and Roberts, TIMES, Feb. 4, 1971, at 1, 2, 15; JONATHAN
AITKEN, OFFICIALLY SECRET (1971).
35. See Duncan Campbell, Official Secrecy and British Libertarianism, 16 SOCIALIST REG.
75 (1979); see also CRISPIN AUBREY, WHO’S WATCHING YOU?  BRITAIN’S SECURITY SERVICES
AND THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT (1981); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE JUSTICE GAME (1999).
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2011, the Metropolitan Police began proceedings under official secrecy
legislation to force that newspaper to reveal how journalists had
obtained information that the mobile phone of a murder victim (Milly
Dowler) had been hacked.  Consent of the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions to prosecute The Guardian was not forthcoming, but sufficient evi-
dence was amassed to bring proceedings against dozens of journalists,
mainly from the News of the World newspaper—which was shut down in
2011 because of its scandalous behaviour—for illegal telephone inter-
ceptions and other offences.37
The danger of the criminalisation of journalists in connection with
their reporting of terrorism lurks not only in the breadth of informa-
tion which a government might view as useful to terrorism but also in
what is counted as “terrorism.”  Amongst the special offences of greatest
threat to journalism in the United Kingdom include section 58—pos-
session of information useful to terrorism—and section 58A—eliciting,
publishing, or communicating information about members of the
security forces of a kind useful for terrorism such as by taking photo-
graphs—of Terrorism Act 2000, and the offence of attending training
sites under section 8 of the Terrorism Act 2006.38
The most prominent recent illustration is, as mentioned earlier,
the case of David Miranda.  Miranda was not charged with any offence,
but the portrayal of him—and his colleagues—as suspected terrorists
opened up special policing powers and raised the possibility of journal-
ists being charged with special terrorism-related offences.  In Miranda v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Commissioner of the Police of
the Metropolis,39 the facts were that David Miranda was transporting com-
puter materials from Berlin—including files from the Government
Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”)—supplied by Edward
Snowden, a former contractor with the U.S. National Security Agency
(“NSA”).  The materials had been supplied by journalist Laura Poitras
in Berlin and were being transported to journalist Glenn Greenwald in
Rio de Janeiro to assist with ongoing disclosures in The Guardian about
GCHQ and the NSA.40  The materials were seized during an examina-
36. See Michael Zander, Dropping the Case, 175 JUST. PEACE 573 (2011).
37. See BRIAN LEVESON, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF
THE PRESS (2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/270939/0780_i.pdf; R v. Coulson and Kuttner [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1026
(UK); Crown Prosecution Service Re-review of Operation Elveden—Statement from the Director of
Public Prosecutions, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.cps.gov.uk/
news/latest_news/crown_prosecution_service_re_review_of_operation_elveden/index
.html; Statement from the Crown Prosecution Service: No Further Action to Be Taken in Operations
Weeting or Golding, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.cps.gov.uk/
news/latest_news/no_further_action_to_be_taken_in_operations_weeting_or_golding/.
38. See WALKER, supra note 5, at 181–210.
39. Miranda v. Sec’y of State of Home Dep’t [2016] EWCA Civ 6 (UK); see Michael
Zander, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, 178 CRIM. L. & JUST. WKLY. 151 (2014).
40. Detained in the U.S.: Filmmaker Laura Poitras Held, Questioned Some 40 Times at U.S.
Airports, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/2012/4/20/
detained_in_the_us_filmmaker_laura (reporting that Poitras has been repeatedly
detained and searched at U.S. airports); see also GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE:
EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); TRANSPARENT
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tion and detention—for nine hours—of Miranda while he was transit-
ing through Heathrow Airport in 2013.41
The powers that were invoked were part of the port and border
control provisions under Part V and Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act
2000.42  Their purpose is to disrupt possible terrorist planning and
logistics and also to gather intelligence.  The controls also deter attacks
on the travel facilities and on aircraft. Examining officers—who are
mainly police officers—may question persons under Schedule 7, para-
graph 1, for the purpose of determining whether they appear to be a
“terrorist” within the Terrorism Act 2000, section 40(1)(b).43  Reflect-
ing the “all-risks” nature of these powers,44 examining officers may
exercise their powers whether or not they have suspicion against any
individual—paragraph 2.  In this way, the “copper’s nose”45 may guide
application.  Some interventions will be based on intelligence, perhaps
related to destination, behavioural signals, or on documentary irregu-
larities.46  However, the use of examinations for extraneous purposes,
such as to build the case for the issuance of an executive order, is not
permitted—a limitation sustained in CC v Commissioner of Police for the
Metropolis.47  At the same time, that case confirms the following fea-
tures: that the basis for intervention can be intuition; that the powers
can be applied against someone already suspect in order to determine
further details of involvement; and that examinations can continue
even if initial indications of terrorism are negative.48  A requirement of
LIVES: SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA (Colin J. Bennett et al. eds., 2014); BERNARD E. HAR-
COURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015).
41. Miranda,[2016] EWCA Civ 6 (UK).
42. See Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, §53, sch.7 (UK); The Special Immigration
Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, SI 2013/1034, arts. 47–49 (UK).  For the
U.S. legal position, see Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d
559 (D.C. Cir. 2015), remanded to 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 785
F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES (2013); PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (Jan. 23,
2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Re
cords_Program-2.pdf; PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 UK OF THE FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (July 2, 2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/702-
Report-2.pdf; CLIVE P. WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
(3d ed. 2014).
43. See also CLIVE P. WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 214 (2d
ed. 1992).
44. See Clive P. Walker, Neighbor Terrorism and the All-Risks Policing of Terrorism, 3 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 121, 123 (2009).
45. LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2006 OF THE TERROR-
ISM ACT 2000, 33 (2007).
46. See DAVID ANDERSON, THE TERRORISM ACTS IN 2011: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEWER ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND PART 1 OF THE TERRORISM
ACT 2006, 109 (2012).
47. CC v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC (Admin) 3316 (UK).
48. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 16, 18.
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reasonable suspicion would, it is claimed, unduly compromise police
capability to detect terrorism,49 such as where a person is involved
“unknowingly” or is of interest to the police based solely on their desti-
nation.50  Reasonable suspicion requirements might also encourage the
use of “clean skins,” alert suspects to surveillance, and prevent the
examination of—perhaps unwitting—travel companions.51  To allay
some of these concerns, an accompany Code of Practice issues an
admonition not to discriminate or to select based on ethnic characteris-
tics52 and focuses selection based upon:
Known and suspected sources of terrorism; Individuals or groups
whose current or past involvement in acts or threats of terrorism is
known or suspected, and supporters or sponsors of such activity
who are known or suspected; Any information on the origins and/
or location of terrorist groups; Possible current, emerging and
future terrorist activity; The means of travel (and documentation)
that a group or individuals involved in terrorist activity could use;
Emerging local trends or patterns of travel through specific ports
or in the wider vicinity that may be linked to terrorist activity. . .[;
and/or] Observation of an individual’s behaviour.53
In the case of Miranda, the initial view of the Security Service
(MI5), which issued a “Port Circulation Sheet” to the police Counter
Terrorism Command regarding Miranda, was that Schedule 7 was “Not
Applicable.”54  These doubts were not conveyed to the examining
officers on the ground.  However, a third round of deliberations by the
Security Service agents concluded that Miranda was concerned in ter-
rorism because his mission sought to influence the government by pro-
moting a political or ideological cause under the Terrorism Act 2000,
section 1(1)(b) and (c).55  In this way, the core argument in the case—
internally in the security and policing agencies and later in court—was
whether David Miranda could be categorised as a “terrorist” under sec-
tion 40 of the Terrorism Act 2000:
(1) In this Part “terrorist” means a person who—
(a) has committed an offence under any of sections 11, 12,
15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63, or
(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation
or instigation of acts of terrorism.
(2) The reference in subsection (1)(b) to a person who has been
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism includes a reference to a person who has been, whether
49. Id. at ¶ 9.
50. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR,
CRIME AND POLICING BILL (SECOND REPORT), 2013–14, H.L. 108, H.C. 951, ¶ 24 (UK).
51. ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 112.
52. HOME OFFICE, EXAMINING OFFICERS AND REVIEW OFFICERS UNDER SCHEDULE 7 TO
THE TERRORISM ACT 2000: CODE OF PRACTICE, 2015, ¶ 4, at 6; ¶ 18, at 11 (UK).
53. Id. at ¶ 19, 11.
54. Miranda v. Sec’y of State of Home Dep’t [2014] EWHC (Admin) 255 [9], [10]
(UK).
55. Id. at [12].
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before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism within the
meaning given by section 1.56
In this case, section 40(1)(b) was claimed to be applicable, and so it
required Miranda to be viewed in some way as being involved in “terror-
ism” as per the definition in the Terrorism Act 2000, section 1:
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action
where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government
or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person
committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public
or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to dis-
rupt an electronic system.57
Looking first at the issues of purpose and motive under section
1(1)(b) and (c), an alternative explanation to that latterly offered by
the Security Service, which denies the applicability of section 1, might
claim that the mission was one of revealing interesting facts in order to
sell newspapers.  This possibility was not proffered as such, and instead,
Greenwald claimed before the High Court that the purpose of “respon-
sible journalism” is the public interest,58 an asserted privilege dismissed
by the High Court on the basis that journalists have no such constitu-
tional responsibility.59  By comparison, a more convincing and limited
claim to a purely journalistic mission was sustained in R v. Murney.60
There, the collection of information about policing in Newry by an
officer of Eirı´gı´—a minor socialist Republican political party in North-
ern Ireland—was not an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000, section
58A—eliciting, publishing, or communicating information about mem-
bers of the security forces which is of a kind likely to be useful for ter-
rorism.  While photographs of police activity could assist terrorism, the
Crown Court in Belfast sustained that there was proof of a reasonable
cause.  The reasonable cause arose from genuine public concern about
police abuses in circumstances where there was an ongoing protest in
support of Republican Prisoners and the defendant was a participant in
56. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, §§ 40(1), 40(2) (UK).
57. Id. at §§ 1(1), 1(2).
58. Miranda, [2014] EWHC 255 at [55]. See also GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO
HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014).
59. Miranda, [2014] EWHC 255 at [71].
60. R. v. Murney, [2014] NICC 4 (UK).
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this protest as well as being the Public Relations Officer for Eirı´gı´, which
had organised the protest.
Returning to Miranda, as for the “action” element within section
1(1)(a) and section 1(2), section 1(2)(c) and (d) were the operative
parts called in aid.  The High Court decided that it was sufficient that
the examining officers contemplated that the disclosure of data to a
hostile state (Russia) or to terrorists, both of whom might be amongst
the avid readership of publications based on the data, might imperil the
identities of secret agents or the methods used for electronic surveil-
lance of terrorists.61  Thus, the material was placed in the realms of
terrorism and not just official secrecy.62  The formulation of “terrorism”
in the mind of the examining officer did not require any specific
offence to be formulated, nor must mens rea—beyond the “design” and
“purpose” detectable from the mission—be established on the part of
the traveller since there could be interest either in material being trans-
ported or in the traveller.63  Nevertheless, the power must be exercised
on “some reasoned basis, proportionately . . . and in good faith.”64
There was also no need to conclude that David Miranda was a person
falling within section 40(1)(b) prior to the stop.65  Nor did his express
targeting exclude the exercise of Schedule 7 where the person had
already fallen under suspicion; as stated in CC v Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, “the language of s.40(1)(b) is wide enough to allow for
examination not only of whether [a person] appears to be a terrorist
but also of the way in which or the act by which he so appears.”66
Having been satisfied that David Miranda could be categorised as a
“terrorist” for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000, the final stage in
the argument was to consider under administrative67 and human rights
law68 whether the action taken was otherwise lawful.  The High Court
held that there was a compelling and proportionate interest to seize the
data, especially as the Court denied the status of “journalistic materials”
within Article 10, albeit on the dubious basis that they had been
stolen.69
61. Miranda [2014] EWHC 255 at [24]–[25].
62. Id.
63. Id. at [34]; see also Zander, supra note 39.
64. Miranda [2014] EWHC 255 at [31].
65. Id. at [34].
66. CC v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC (Admin) 3316 [16]
(UK).
67. For English administrative law, see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (appeal taken from Eng.); L. COMM’N, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATUTORY APPEALS, Law Com. No. 226, HC 669 (H.M.S.O.
1994); L. COMM’N, ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS: PUBLIC BODIES AND THE CITIZEN, Law Com.
No. 322, HC 6 (H.M.S.O. 2012).
68. See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK); see generally RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH
TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed., 2009); TOM HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW
AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2010); ALAN D.P. BRADY, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFER-
ENCE UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: AN INSTITUTIONALLY SENSITIVE APPROACH (2012).
69. Human Rights Act, c. 42, sch. 1, § 1 (3); see also Oxford v. Moss (1979) 68 Cr.
App. Rep. 183 (Eng.) (ruling that information could not be deemed to be intangible
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The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation70—David
Anderson—commented that the High Court had endorsed so wide an
ambit for the term “terrorism” that journalists and newspapers could
potentially become subject to special criminal offences, could be pro-
scribed—banned—, could be designated under terrorist asset-freezing
legislation, and could be subjected to executive restraint orders.71  At
the same time, these potential calamities must be seen in the context of
requirements of proportionality and respect for rights to free speech, so
that Miranda made clear that “[t]here is no suggestion that media
reporting on terrorism ought per se to be considered equivalent to assist-
ing terrorists.”72
As well as being stopped for “examination” under paragraph 2 of
Schedule 7,73 the traveller may also be searched under paragraph 8 by
an examining officer or a person authorized under paragraph 10.74
Property may be seized for investigation for seven days under paragraph
11.  An increasingly common seizure scenario has involved the capture
of data from laptops, data devices, and mobile phones.  The practice
has been to return the hardware within seven days but to retain the
copied data in accordance with the guidance in the Management of Police
Information (“MoPI”),75 which suggests a six-year retention period.76
Seizure of data, which was being transported for journalistic purposes,
was at the heart of a further hearing in R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department and Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.77  An
interim hearing was held shortly after the examination in August 2013
concerning the seized computer data.  It was held that inspection may
take place for the purposes of securing national security or for the
property and therefore was incapable of being stolen within the Theft Act 1968); Grant v.
Procurator Fiscal [1988] RPC 41 (Scot.).
70. See Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 36 (UK).
71. DAVID ANDERSON, THE TERRORISM ACTS IN 2013: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEWER ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND PART I OF THE TERRORISM
ACT 2006, 28–32 (2014).  The government’s official response is to await the outcome of
further litigation. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, THE GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO THE ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM ACTS IN 2013 BY
THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, 2015, Cm. 9032 (UK).
72. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. [2014] EWHC 255, [35] (UK).
73. The term is mentioned but not defined by the Terrorism Act 2000, sch.7.  It
refers to the collection of powers affecting travellers under Schedule 7.
74. These provisions were reformed by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Polic-
ing Act 2014, 2014, c. 12, sch. 9, following the OFFICE FOR SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERROR-
ISM HOME OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF SCHEDULE 7: A PUBLIC CONSULTATION
(2012) (UK).
75. AUTHORISED PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, Information Management: Retention, Review,
and Disposal, COLLEGE OF POLICING (last updated July 28, 2015), https://www
.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/management-of-police-
information/retention-review-and-disposal-of-police-information/. This guidance is
viewed as relevant by the HOME OFFICE, EXAMINING OFFICERS AND REVIEW OFFICERS UNDER
SCHEDULE 7 TO THE TERRORISM ACT 2000: CODE OF PRACTICE (2015).
76. See R (RMC & FJ) v. Metro. Police Comm’r [2012] EWHC (Admin) 1681; M.M.
v. United Kingdom (No. 157), 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng#{“appno”:[“\”24029/07\“,”],“documentcollectionid2”:[“GRANDCHAMBER”,
“CHAMBER”],“itemid”:[“001-114517”]}.
77. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. [2013] EWHC (Admin) 2609.
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investigation of terrorism.78  There was no exemption for journalistic
materials.
Once the material is obtained under Schedule 7, it can be trans-
ferred to the security services under section 19(1) of the Counter Ter-
rorism Act 2008, by which “[a] person may disclose information to any
of the intelligence services for the purposes of the exercise by that ser-
vice of any of its functions.” Furthermore, by section 19(6)(b), “[a] dis-
closure under this section does not breach . . . any other restriction on
the disclosure of information (however imposed).”  The data was trans-
ferred and retained even though Miranda was allowed to depart on his
way after the detention under Schedule 7 had ended, and no further
legal action had ensued either in relation to the data or Miranda—
whose criminal mens rea might be compromised by the heavy encryption
of the data.  The High Court referred to the data being “stolen”,79 but
Snowden had obtained copied data, and the hardware possessed by
Miranda was not stolen property.80  Consequently, no evident legal
basis for police retention emerged to override paragraph 11.81  Reflect-
ing the need to keep up to date with technological developments,82 as
highlighted in the Miranda case, later legislation, the Anti-social Beha-
viour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, Schedule 9, paragraph 4 inserted
paragraph 11A into Schedule 7.  It grants an express power for police
constables only83 to make and retain copies of anything obtained from
searches under paragraph 5, 8, or 9.  Copies may be retained for as long
as is necessary for investigative purposes or for use as evidence in crimi-
nal or deportation proceedings.  However, retention is subject to the
Data Protection Act 1998 and the MoPI guidance.  Suggestions that
these powers—and other search powers in Schedule 7—should be exer-
cisable on reasonable suspicion84 and that legally privileged and special
procedure—including journalistic—material should be exempted were
rejected during passage of the legislation through Parliament.85
Aside from the decision in Miranda, consideration was given in
Beghal v. DPP to a wide catalogue of rights within the context of Sched-
ule 7.86  In 2011, Sylvie Beghal passed through East Midlands Airport
78. Id. at [32].
79. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. [2014] EWHC 255, [8] (UK).
80. See L COMM’N, supra note 67.
81. See Costello v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2001] EWCA (Civ) 381; Webb v.
Chief Constable of Merseyside [1999] EWCA (Civ) 3041; Settelen v. Comm’r of Police of
the Metro. [2004] EWHC 2171.  One possible argument is that the Official Secrets Act
1989, 1989, c. 6, § 8, by which a Crown servant must take care to prevent the unauthorised
disclosure of any document or article which it would be an offence under that legislation
to disclose, makes it an offence to return data to Miranda because the return would
involve a breach of offences in sections 1–4 of that Act by the police.
82. 9 July 2013, Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2013) col. 454 (UK).
83. Id. at col. 456.
84. 750 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2013) col. 807 (UK); 751 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.)
(2014) col. 497 (UK); JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ANTI-
SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, CRIME AND POLICING BILL, 2013–14, HL 56, HC 713, ¶ ¶112–13, 125
(UK).
85. 750 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2013) col. 810 (UK).
86. Beghal v. DPP [2015] UKSC 49 (appeal taken from Gr. Brit.).
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with her three children after visiting her husband, Djamel Beghal, in
Paris, where he was detained on terrorist offences.87  She was stopped
by the police, which exercised its powers under Schedule 7 to question,
search, and detain her for around 105 minutes.  She was searched and
was asked about her husband, her reasons for travel, and her travel
arrangements.  She refused to answer most of the questions and was
charged under paragraph 18 with the offence of wilful failure to comply
with the requirement to give the examining officer any information in
her possession, which the officer requested.  She later pleaded guilty to
the offence and was sentenced to a conditional discharge.  She then
challenged whether her treatment had been consistent with her rights
under the European Convention on Human Rights.88
The UK Supreme Court rejected the various human rights chal-
lenges in Beghal, reflecting the equal confidence on the part of the
Home Office that the port controls are compliant with the European
Convention on Human Rights following the reforms in the Anti-social
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014,89 having previously received
assurances to that effect about anti-terrorism search powers in
Miranda.90
As for the right to liberty under Article 5, a power to detain for at
least this length of time was located within the exception for a stated
legal “obligation” under Article 5(1)(b), with particular indulgence
being shown for intrusions at borders and without the necessity for rea-
sonable suspicion.  This verdict was reached by the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights in regard to travellers to and from both parts of
Ireland in McVeigh, O’Neill, and Evans v. United Kingdom91 and in Harkin,
X, Lyttle, Gillen, and McCann v. United Kingdom.92  Next, in Gillan and
Quinton v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
viewed the exercise of search powers at ports and airports as being
excused by consent under Article 8.93  Alternatively, the transitory
87. The Beghal family lived in France from 1990 to 1997 and then in the UK.  On
15 March 2005, Djamel Beghal was convicted in France of “criminal association in rela-
tion with a terrorist undertaking” and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.  His French
citizenship was stripped in July 2006, but attempts to deport him on the day of his release
on 30 May 2009 to Algeria were stopped because of challenges on grounds of safety.  He
was released under house arrest conditions in France (the UK having formally excluded
him in 2009) but was rearrested in 2011 and convicted in 2013 and sentenced to 10 years
for involvement in the escape of Smain Ait Ali Belkacem, one of the attackers against the
Metro station at the Museum Orsay in 1995.
88. Supra note 12.
89. See HOME OFFICE, MEMORANDUM ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, 2013, ¶ ¶ 192–93 (UK).
90. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. [2014] EWHC 255 [82], [88]
(UK).
91. App. Nos. 8022, 8025, 8027/77 Eur. Comm’n H.R.  Dec. & Rep. (1981); DR 18
p. 66 (admissibility), DR 25 p 15 (final report). See also R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The
Law of Human Rights (2nd ed. 2009).
92. [1985] App. Nos. 11539, 11641, 11650, 11651, 11652/85 (UK), Ser A Vol.324
(1981).
93. Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, App. No.4158/05, [64], 187 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2010). See also Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan, (2013) App. No.26291/06, (UK).  A fur-
ther challenge is pending in Malik v. United Kingdom, App. No.32968/11 (UK).
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intrusion into a traveller’s journey could even be viewed as not amount-
ing to a deprivation of liberty at all.94  As the wife of a convicted terror-
ist, the cause of her examination was evident under Article 5, while the
examination power in general, though lacking any trigger of reasonable
suspicion, was in fact applied in a discerning way to only 0.025% of
travellers.95
Her Article 8 complaint was also not sustained because there are
sufficient safeguards and controls against overbroad and arbitrary use,
and the power is proportionately connected to the proper objective of
Schedule 7, which is preventing and detecting terrorism and represents
a level of intrusion which is comparatively light and not beyond the
reasonable expectations of airport travellers in contemporary times of
terrorist threat.96  The UK Supreme Court also considered that there is
also no substantial risk of these powers being used on a racially discrimi-
natory basis, given the safeguards and the statistics, which show that the
exercise of Schedule 7 powers is proportionate to the terrorist popula-
tion.97  The retention of electronic data could also be a justified intru-
sion into private life, though retention beyond the time of the
examination should be based on objectively established grounds for sus-
picion.98  This power was not applied to Beghal but was of course
highly relevant to Miranda.
Finally, the UK Supreme Court also considered the issue of due
process under Article 6, an aspect that conversely did not affect
Miranda.  The problem is that Schedule 7 affects the privilege against
self-incrimination.  It was accepted that the risk of criminal prosecution
based on answers to Schedule 7 is negligible—though not impossible
since the Director of Public Prosecutions refused to rule out a prosecu-
tion—since section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
would inevitably render such evidence inadmissible as unfair in any
criminal trial.99  Nevertheless, a port examination is not a form of crim-
94. Id. at 52–56.  For the meaning of detention in this context, see R (Laporte) v.
Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006] UKHL 55; Austin v. Comm’r of
Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5; Austin v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 39692/09,
40713/09, 41008/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Colon v. Netherlands, App. No. 49458/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Roberts v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis [2015] UKSC 79.
95. Id. at ¶ 18.  Lord Kerr (dissenting) viewed the potential for abuse as decisive. Id.
at ¶ 102.
96. Id. at ¶¶ 43–51.
97. Id. at ¶ 50.
98. Id. at ¶¶ 57–58.
99. Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 78 (Eng.):
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evi-
dence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.
In Beghal’s case, the denial of access to a lawyer may have rendered any admission to
be unfair. See R (Elosta) v. Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 3397
(Q.B.), ¶ 32 (Eng.); see also Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, c. 12, ¶ 5,
sch. 9 (Eng.) (Extending the rights in the Terrorism Act (“TA”) 2000, Schedule 8,
paragraphs 6 and 7, to have a named person informed of the fact of the detention and
the right to consult a solicitor in private to persons detained at ports, airports, or interna-
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inal investigation, so that Article 6 was deemed inapplicable.100  Even in
Beghal, it was silence that was incriminating rather than any answers she
gave, and this distinction reflects a line of European Court of Human
Rights decisions that have sometimes doubted the legitimacy of the use
of forced answers in criminal proceedings rather than pressure to
answer per se.101  Once again, the attempt during the passage of the
legislation to expressly exclude prosecution arising from forced answers
was not successful.102
Whilst these findings of the U.K. Supreme Court equally rule out a
range of challenges in circumstances such as in Miranda, they did not
deal with any challenge based on freedom of expression under Article
10.  Since none arose in Beghal, Article 10 was given no express recogni-
tion or protection in the Schedule 7 scheme when Article 10 was con-
sidered by the High Court in Miranda.  That Court found no absolute
rule of prior judicial scrutiny for cases involving State interference with
journalistic freedom and relied on the doctrine of the margin of appre-
ciation to uphold Article 10.103  There was, however, some recognition
of the tendency of the European Court of Human Rights to demand
prior judicial authorisation for impingement upon confidential journal-
istic materials, though it was not viewed as an absolute rule.104
Perhaps with this warning in mind and perhaps in light of submis-
sions from Parliament and from the Independent Reviewer of the Ter-
rorism Legislation,105 the Home Office significantly amended its Draft
Code of Practice for examining officers and review officers under
tional rail stations.  Furthermore, by paragraph 7A (paragraph 16A for Scotland), where a
person detained for examination requests to consult a solicitor, questioning is suspended
until the consultation has taken place or the person expresses a change of wishes.  These
rights may be qualified in the context of Schedule 7 detentions on extra grounds beyond
those specified in the TA 2000, Schedule 8, where a person is not detained at a desig-
nated police station.  The questioning may continue if the examining officer reasonably
believes that postponement would prejudice the examination.).
100. Id. at ¶¶ 64–69.  Lord Kerr (dissenting, ¶¶ 112–18) (calling in aid the wider
concept of the privilege against self-incrimination at common law which requires only a
“real and appreciable risk” of criminal proceedings being brought (citing In re Westing-
house Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litig. MDL, Docket No. 235 (Nos. 1 and 2)
[1978] AC 547 (HL) 574 (appeal taken from Eng.)) and applies to the risk of prosecu-
tion, not just conviction (citing Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v.
Lundqvist [1991] 2 Q.B. 310; JSC BTA Bank v. Ablyazov (No. 13) [2014] EWHC 2788)).
101. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, Eur. Ct. H.R (1996); IJL
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 29522/95, 30056/96, 30574/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000);
O’Halloran & Francis v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 15809/02, 25624/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2007). See also Procurator Fiscal v. Brown [2000] UKPC D3; Regina v. Allen [2001]
UKHL 45.
102. See 750 Parl Deb HC (2013) col. 801 (UK); SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME
DEPT., THE GOV’T RESPONSE TO THE ANNUAL REP. ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM
ACTS IN 2012 BY THE INDEP. REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGIS., 2013, Parl. 1, at 9 (UK).
103. Roberts v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis [2015] UKSC 49 ¶ 88–89.
104. Id. at ¶ 88. See Sanoma Utigevers BV v. Netherlands, App. No. 38224/03 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2010); Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media BV v. Netherlands, App.
No.39315/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Nagla v. Latvia, App. No. 73469/10 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013); Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 47143/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).
105. HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, COUNTER-TERRORISM, 2013–14, H.C. 231, ¶ 93
(UK); ANDERSON, supra note 71, ¶¶ 7.31(b), Annex 2 ¶ 39.
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Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which had been released in
December 2014.  Paragraph 40 originally stated that:
The examining officer may copy any information obtained under
paragraph 5; searched or found on a search under paragraph 8;
or anything examined under paragraph 9 including electronic
data (although examining officers should [cease reviewing, and]
not copy information which they have reasonable grounds for
believing is subject to legal privilege, as defined in section 10 of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984).106
However, this paragraph was notably altered in the final version, which
appeared in March 2015:
The examining officer may copy any information obtained under
paragraph 5; searched or found on a search under paragraph 8;
or anything examined under paragraph 9 including electronic
data (although examining officers should cease reviewing, and
not copy, information which they have reasonable grounds for
believing is subject to legal privilege, is excluded material or spe-
cial procedure material, as defined in sections 10, 11 and 14 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984).107
Reference to “special procedure material” in section 14(1)(b) refers to
“journalistic material, other than excluded material”,108 while “journal-
istic material” is defined in section 13 as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Act “journalistic mate-
rial” means material acquired or created for the purposes of
journalism.
(2) Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of this
Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it
for the purposes of journalism.
(3) A person who receives material from someone who intends
that the recipient shall use it for the purposes of journalism is to
be taken to have acquired it for those purposes.109
Thus, if the facts of Miranda were to occur now, the officers should not
deal with any such journalistic material under Schedule 7 and instead
would have to invoke more formal powers to deal with “excluded mater-
ials”, which are defined in section 11 to include journalistic materials
held in confidence.  The effect is that there would have to be resort to
specific powers that allow for the search and retention of excluded
materials, which would inevitably entail the important safeguard of an
106. HOME OFFICE, EXAMINING OFFICERS AND REVIEW OFFICERS UNDER SCHEDULE 7
TO THE TERRORISM ACT 2000: CODE OF PRACTICE ¶ 40 (July 2014). https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/339197/schedule7.pdf.
107. HOME OFFICE, supra note 52, ¶ 40.
108. POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 § 14(1)(b), LEGISLATION.GOV.UK,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents.
109. Id. at § 13.  See R v. Crown Court at Bristol, ex p Bristol Press and Picture
Agency Ltd. (1986) 85 Cr. App. Rep. 190, DC (press photographs of riots were special
procedure material).
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application for a judicial warrant.  One potential basis for such an appli-
cation would be section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911:
(1) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that
there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under
this Act has been or is about to be committed, he may grant a
search warrant authorising any constable [named therein] to
enter at any time any premises or place named in the warrant, if
necessary, by force, and to search the premises or place and every
person found therein, and to seize any sketch, plan, model, arti-
cle, note, or document, or anything of a like nature or anything
which is evidence of an offence under this Act having been or
being about to be committed, which he may find on the premises
or place or on any such person, and with regard to or in connex-
ion with which he has reasonable ground for suspecting that an
offence under this Act has been or is about to be committed.
(2) Where it appears to a superintendent of police that the case is
one of great emergency and that in the interest of the State imme-
diate action is necessary, he may by a written order under his hand
give to any constable the like authority as may be given by the
warrant of a justice under this section.110
Alternatively, and even more likely, would be an application for a pro-
duction order—or in default a search warrant—in relation to “excepted
material”—which includes “excluded material”—under paragraph 5 of
Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000.111  The application can be made
to a Circuit judge or a District Judge—Magistrates’ Courts—for an
order “for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.”112
Schedule 7 returned to the U.K. courts with the Court of Appeal’s
decision in Miranda in January 2016.113  The judgment included some
radical departures from the High Court verdict, but without fundamen-
tally altering the outcome.  The same depiction of Miranda was
accepted, as before—he was primarily a terrorist threat and not a
national security threat, which meant that the invocation of Schedule 7
was lawful.114  It was further held that the police were entitled to con-
sider whether material in the possession of Miranda might be released
in circumstances falling within the definition of “terrorism” and there-
fore had sufficient “grounds” to detain him in relation to which:
Parliament has set the bar for the exercise of the Schedule 7
power at quite a low level . . . . [T]he power has been given to
provide an opportunity for the ascertainment of the possibility that
a traveller at a port may be concerned in the commission, prepara-
tion or instigation of an act of terrorism.115
110. Official Secrets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 28,  § 9 (UK).
111. See CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, 57–58, §2.16 (Carlile of Berriew et.
al. eds., 2011).
112. Id. at 60.
113. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2016] EWCA Civ 6 (UK).
114. Id. at ¶ 34.
115. Id. at ¶¶ 57–58.
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Nor was it necessarily unjustified or disproportionate to take action just
because Miranda was involved in journalism.116
In two important respects the Court of Appeal departed from the
reasoning of the High Court.  First, the definition of “terrorism” was
revised.  The Court of Appeal held that a mental element must, con-
trary to what it accepted as the literal interpretation, be met in relation
to the element of action within section 1(2), meaning that intent or
recklessness as to the action within section 1(2) of the Terrorism Act
2000 must be proven.117  A number of reasons were adduced for this
abrupt discovery, overlooked by previous courts, such as the UK
Supreme Court in R v. Gul, which stated that “[d]espite the undesirable
consequences of the combination of the very wide definition of ‘terror-
ism’ and the provisions of section 117, it is difficult to see how the natu-
ral, very wide, meaning of the definition can properly be cut down by
this Court.”118  None of the reasons given by the Court of Appeal for
the radical departure are wholly convincing.
First, the Court of Appeal had to accept that its reasoning was une-
ven and incomplete.  For these purposes, the Court of Appeal divided
“action” in section 1(2) into three categories.119  The first was section
1(2)(a) and (b), which, since it describes a person as being “involved”
in violence or damage to property must require awareness that he is
being so involved, though “involved” could equally refer to causation as
to intent.  The third category was section 1(2)(e) which is defined
according to its aim and, therefore, was said to be clearly defined by
reference to the state of mind of the actor, though “aim” could be satis-
fied by motive and purpose as well as intent.  More difficult for the
Court of Appeal was its second category, section 1(2)(c) and (d), which
relates to the consequences of actions and which could, on a literal
interpretation, include acts which endanger life by design even if the
actor is not subjectively aware that they do.  At best, the Court of Appeal
had to overcome this variation on the basis that:
[i]f Parliament had intended to provide that a person commits an
act of terrorism where he unwittingly or accidentally does some-
thing which in fact endangers another person’s life, I would have
expected that, in view of the serious consequences of classifying a
person as a terrorist, it would have spelt this out clearly.120
A closely related argument was that the Court of Appeal viewed the
absence of mens rea as creating overreach: “[terrorism] would include
activity that is entirely non-violent; is in pursuit of a legitimate and
mainstream political cause; may ‘endanger life’ by accident; and where
the person may be ‘concerned’ in such activity wholly accidentally or
even without knowledge.”121  Examples were adduced of unpalatable
116. Id. at ¶ 82.
117. Id. at ¶ 55.
118. R v. Gul [2013] UKSC 64, ¶ 38 (appeal taken from Eng.).
119. Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t  [2016] EWCA Civ 6 at ¶¶ 53–54
(UK).
120. Id. at ¶ 54.
121. Id. ¶ 43.
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instances of “terrorism”, including agitation—on religious or political
grounds—against the vaccination of children for certain diseases; or
circumstances where a group of protesters erect a sign to protest about
Government policy which is inadvertently erected in a way that acciden-
tally endangers the life of a passer-by.122  Yet, these effects and over-
breadth can conceivably be resolved without the insertion of mens rea.
In particular, the elements of motive and purpose in section 1 could
hardly be satisfied by accident.  If the actions were not being carried out
with a specified purpose or with the requisite motive, then section 1 is
not satisfied.  Some level of self-awareness is required, but this is not the
same as mens rea.  Furthermore, overbreadth is expressly confronted in
other ways by the legislative scheme, including by a special independent
review mechanism under the Terrorism Act 2006, section 36, and by
the requirement for consent to prosecution by the Director of Public
Prosecutions or, in some cases, by the Attorney General under section
117 of the Terrorism Act 2000.123
The second reason of the Court of Appeal was based on legislative
history.  It mentioned that when introducing the Terrorism Act 2000,
the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, argued in Parliament that “[terrorism]
is premeditated, and aims to create a climate of extreme fear.”124
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal also failed to note that Straw went
on to say, “[c]lause 1 does not create an offence of terrorism.  It sets out
the extremely specific circumstances in which the use of police powers
can be triggered or in which the use of other powers can be triggered—
also in very controlled circumstances.”125  In the circumstances, “pre-
meditated” could again refer as much to motive and purpose as to any
element of intent.
Though not so clearly engaged with by the Court of Appeal, a third
reason to doubt its conclusion, hinted at by Jack Straw, is legislative
purpose.  The fundamental idea of the legal concept of terrorism is to
move on from the confines of the jurisprudence of crime.  Section 1
does not create any criminal offence,126 nor does it derive from crimi-
nal law concepts.127  Instead the term is mainly conceived and used as a
basis for pre-emptive action by the police and executive—such as in the
proscription of organisations, financial controls and other personal
restrictions on suspects, and wide investigative powers for the police.
True enough, the term “terrorism” is embodied in various special crimi-
122. Id. ¶¶ 45–46.  These examples derive from D. Anderson, THE TERRORISM ACTS
IN 2014:  REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER ON THE OPERATION IN 2014 OF THE TER-
RORISM ACT 2000 AND PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 (2015) ¶¶ 4.14–4.21.
123. As mentioned by the U.K. Supreme Court in R v. Gul [2013] UKSC 64, ¶¶ 30,
34.
124. HC Deb 14 December 1999 vol 341 col 152.
125. Id. at col.156. Cf. [2016] EWCA Civ 6 at ¶ 49, which not only takes the first
quote out of context but also gives a faulty reference.
126. See Miranda v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. [2014] EWHC 255, ¶ 29 per
Laws LJ.  Proposals to enact a crime of terrorism have long been rejected in the U.K. Clive
Walker, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, ch. 5 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).
127. For the history, see C. Walker, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, ch. 1 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2011).
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nal offences, especially in Part VI of the Terrorism Act 2000.  But ele-
ments of mens rea can be added at that point alone, and there is also the
filter of consent to prosecution as already mentioned.  This point about
distinct legislative purpose is also underlined by considering the formu-
lation in section 1—and in its predecessor, section 20(1) of the Preven-
tion of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989128—as distinct from
the reliance upon a list of offences—“scheduled offences” in the North-
ern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973–98.  In this way, section
1 keeps away from any direct link between criminal law and the phe-
nomenon of terrorism.
The second major departure by the Court of Appeal from the deci-
sion of the High Court was its conclusion that the way in which Sched-
ule 7 could be conducted against journalists was not adequately
“prescribed by law” to be within any exception to Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: “TACT, therefore, contains no
adequate legal safeguards relating to journalistic material simpliciter or
to journalistic material the disclosure of which may identify a confiden-
tial source.  Nor are any such safeguards to be found in any other rules
operating within the framework of law.”129  In this way, the require-
ments in cases such as Sanoma Utigevers BV v Netherlands,130 in which the
Grand Chamber held that a Dutch law authorizing the compulsory sur-
render of material to the police for use in a criminal investigation was
repugnant to Article 10, were viewed as more “absolute” than had been
depicted in the High Court.  The requirements included the following:
first, “the protection of journalistic sources . . . must be attended with
legal procedural safeguards commensurate with the importance of the
[Article 10] principle at stake . . . .”131 Second, “[f]irst and foremost
among these safeguards is the guarantee of review by a judge or other
independent and impartial decision-making body [of any requirement
that a journalist hand over material concerning a confidential source]
. . . .”132 Third, “the judge or other independent and impartial body
must thus be in a position to carry out this weighing of the potential
risks and respective interests prior to any disclosure . . . .” The decision
to be taken should be governed by clear criteria . . . .”133  Fourth, “the
exercise of any independent review that only takes place subsequently
to the handing over of material capable of revealing such sources would
undermine the very essence of the right to confidentiality”134 and can-
not therefore constitute a legal procedural safeguard commensurate
with the rights protected by Article 10.  Fifth, however, where “it may be
impracticable for the prosecuting authorities to state elaborate reasons
128. “’[T]errorism’ means the use of violence for political ends and includes any
use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 c. 4 §20 (1).
129. Miranda v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 6, ¶
115.
130. Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
131. Id. at ¶ 88.
132. Id. at ¶ 90.
133. Id. at ¶ 92.
134. Id. at ¶ 91.
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for urgent orders or requests . . . an independent review carried out at
the very least prior to the access and use of obtained materials should
be sufficient to determine whether any issue of confidentiality arises,
and if so, whether . . . the public interest invoked by the investigating or
prosecuting authorities outweighs the general public interest of source
protection.”135
The emphasis placed on the judiciary is somewhat at odds with the
Court of Appeal’s view that “[t]he police and the Security Service have
the expertise and access to secret intelligence material which rightly
make it very difficult to challenge such an assessment in a court of
law.”136  Nevertheless, since Schedule 7 failed to incorporate safeguards
for journalistic materials, which either did disclose sources or might
reveal sources, the provision was held to be incompatible with Article
10.137  This declaration, made under section 4 of the Human Rights Act
1998, does not invalidate Schedule 7—or the finding in the case that
the action was lawful on the facts as applied—but it does send a strong
signal to the executive and Parliament that reform is needed.  The
Court of Appeal did not explicitly consider whether the subsequent
changes made in 2015 to the Code of Practice, discussed above, would
meet their concerns.  However, the Home Office made such an argu-
ment in the wake of the judgment.138  The Code of Practice could be a
sufficient instrument to be ‘in accordance with the law’ under Article
10, though a more explicit piece of legislation may be advisable for such
an important issue as journalistic freedoms.139
Assessing the impact of Schedule 7 port controls on journalism in
light of Miranda, it must be concluded that the special laws became
rather strained—especially through the discovery of the mens rea
requirement—and were fundamentally ill-designed to handle the
important media rights at stake.  An even broader power to examine
and search for materials, the possession of which is contrary to U.K. law,
has been suggested as a more suitable legal vehicle than Schedule 7 or
rules as to imports and exports—such as weapons—or customs dues.140
Materials held in breach of official secrets laws could thereby be
expressly sought.  However, a less ambitious reform emerged in 2015,
namely, to insert within the port controls recognition of journalistic
135. Id. at ¶ 91.
136. Id. at ¶ 82.
137. Id. at ¶ 114.
138. Airport stop of Snowden reporter’s partner David Miranda ‘lawful’, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35343852, (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
139. A similar model is contained in Part II of the Criminal Justice and Police Act
2001, where the police can bundle up and take away for further sifting materials found in
a physical search; once they come across special procedure material, they have to apply to
a judge. Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001 s.55 (UK).
140. There exists a broad power to ‘rummage’ in the prevention of smuggling
under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s.27 (UK).  For import and export
controls, see Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954, SI 1954/23 (UK); Import and
Export Control Act 1990 (UK); Export Control Act 2002 (UK); Export Control Order
2008, SI 2008/3231 (UK); Zeray Yihdego & Ashley Savage, The UK Arms Export Regime:
Progress and Challenges, 2008 PUBLIC LAW 546 (2008).
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interests, though whether a Code of Practice represents a sufficient
degree of recognition remains to be determined.  Arguably with that
reform in place, the more significant outcome could be the refinement
of the definition of terrorism.  However, as the new interpretation did
not avail David Miranda and might also be viewed by the Home Office
as warding off any troublesome rewriting of section 1, an uneasy but
convenient settlement may have emerged for now, which will unfortu-
nately avert any impetus to reform the definition of terrorism.
III. DEMAND FOR INFORMATION
Cooperation between police and media is ingrained in both low
and high policing.141  There are two common modes of engagement.
The principal mode of relationship is managerial.142  In this mode, the
police, albeit that they are powerful initiators in criminal justice and
can wield coercive powers, are concerned with news management—
how information is released and understood through negotiation and
interaction.  Underlying this approach is a high degree of cooperation
and mutual reliance between police and media, as well as recognition
by the police of the independence and important roles of the media.
Consequently, many previous researchers have found that there is often
a stable and productive relationship between the police and crime
reporters.143  Thus, there is “a sense of dependency between police and
members of the media, uneasy though this may be at times.”144  While
the police may sometimes seek to manipulate media coverage of their
image and work,145 they also depend on the media for the regular con-
veyance of messages to the public and at times utilize the media as an
investigative resource.146  In turn, journalists depend upon the police
for primary information.  It is difficult to be conclusive about which side
acts as primary information-gatekeeper.  Without hard law to regulate
self-serving relationships, temptations to give and take may arise and
have indeed been at the heart of inquiries into press conduct in rela-
tion to telephone tapping and other breaches of privacy in the United
141. See generally Jean-Paul Brodeur, High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks About the
Policing of Political Activities, 30 SOC. PROBS. 507 (1983). See also Clive Walker, The Police and
the Mass Media in Emergencies, 1 HUM. RTS. REV. 15 (2011).
142. Walker, supra note 141 at 15.
143. See, e.g., PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HOWARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE MEDIA
POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1994); RICHARD V. ERICSON, CRIME
AND THE MEDIA (Open Univ. Press 1995); CRIME AND THE MEDIA: THE POST MODERN SPEC-
TACLE (David Kidd-Hewitt & Richard Osborne eds., 1995); DENNIS HOWITT, CRIME, THE
MEDIA AND THE LAW (Wiley ed., 1998); STEVE CHIBNALL, LAW AND ORDER NEWS: AN ANALY-
SIS OF CRIME REPORTING IN THE BRITISH PRESS (Routledge ed., 2001); MAGGIE WYKES,
NEWS, CRIME AND CULTURE (Pluto Press ed., 2001); ROB C. MAWBY, POLICING IMAGES:
POLICING COMMUNICATION AND LEGITIMACY (Willan ed., 2002); FRANK LEISHMAN & PAUL
MASON, POLICING AND THE MEDIA: FACTS, FICTIONS AND FACTIONS (Willan ed., 2003).
144. FRANK LEISHMAN & PAUL MASON, POLICING AND THE MEDIA: FACTS, FICTIONS
AND FACTIONS 31 (Willan ed., 2003).
145. See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, POLICE AND THE MEDIA, 2008–09, HC 75, ¶ 29
(UK).
146. See Martin Innes, The Media as an Investigative Resource in Murder Enquiries, 39
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269 (1999).
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Kingdom in recent years.147  One major impact was the closure of the
News of the World newspaper in 2011.  Journalists have also been con-
victed of breaches of the Data Protection Act of 1998 and the Regula-
tion of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000,148 while police and other
collaborators within officialdom have also been convicted of
corruption.149
The second mode for police-media relations is coercive.150  In cer-
tain circumstances, the police can coerce the media into action or inac-
tion through the application of legal powers.  One such application
might involve the use of the media as surrogate investigators and infor-
mation sources.  This mode of relationship is not common in the
United Kingdom.  Freedom of the press is highly valued in United
Kingdom constitutional law, as evidenced by the special protection for
“freedom of expression” in section 12 of the Human Rights Act of 1998,
which builds upon the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, Article 10.151  Nevertheless, the coer-
cive demand for information may arise under threat of legal powers or
under the actual invocation of legal powers.  In either case, there is a
strong element of coercion and threat.
This modality arose in the Miranda case.  On 20 July 2013, even
before the Heathrow Airport incident—which occurred on 18 August
2013—but revealed after that event, The Guardian disclosed that GCHQ
had forced the newspaper to destroy Snowden-related documents or
face legal action.  The authorities told the paper, “[y]ou’ve had your
fun.  Now we want the stuff back.”152  The materials were held in the
basement of the newspaper’s offices.  In the presence of GCHQ techni-
cians, a senior editor and a Guardian computer expert used angle grind-
147. See INFORMATION COMMISSIONERS OFFICE, WHAT PRICE PRIVACY? THE UNLAWFUL
TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION, 2006, HC 1056 (UK); see also INFORMA-
TION COMMISSIONERS OFFICE, WHAT PRICE PRIVACY NOW? THE FIRST SIX MONTHS PROGRESS
IN HALTING THE UNLAWFUL TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION, 2006, HC 36
(UK); THE LEVESON INQUIRY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF
THE PRESS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2012–13, HC 779 (UK); CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COM-
MITTEE, NEWS INTERNATIONAL AND PHONE-HACKING, 2010–12, HC 903-I (UK); HOME
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, UNAUTHORISED TAPPING INTO OR HACKING OF MOBILE COMMUNICA-
TIONS, 2010–12, HC 907 (UK); SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, THE GOV-
ERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE THIRTEENTH REPORT FROM THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SESSION, 2010–12, HC 907 (UK): UNAUTHORISED TAPPING INTO OR HACKING OF MOBILE
COMMUNICATIONS, Cm. 8182 (UK); COMMITTEE OF PRIVILEGES, FIRST SPECIAL REPORT: MAT-
TER OF PRIVILEGE REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON 22 MAY 2012, 2014 HC 903-I (UK).
148. Coulson & Kuttner v. Regina [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1026, (appeal taken from
Eng.).  (Case includes Clive Goodman (2007); and Dan Evans, Graham Johnson, Ian
Edmondson, Neville Thurlbeck, Greg Miskiw, James Weatherup, Andy Coulson (R v.
Coulson & Kuttner [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1026); and Anthony France (2015).
149. See generally Alan King & Paul Marshall (2005); Alan Tierney & Richard
Trunkfield (2013); Paul Flattley (2013); James Bowes (2013); April Casburn (2013);
Timothy Edwards (2014).
150. Miranda v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 6.
151. Human Rights Act, supra note 68.
152. Alan Rusbridger, David Miranda, schedule 7 and the danger that all reporters now
face, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/aug/19/david-miranda-schedule7-danger-reporters.
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ers and drills to “pulverise the hard drives and memory chips on which
the encrypted files had been stored.”153  It was appreciated that the
destruction was a show of force, because all parties knew that other cop-
ies of the data were held elsewhere—in Russia, the U.S., Brazil, and
China.  But the authorities wanted this destruction to take place to at
least ensure the security of sensitive data within the United Kingdom.
The newspaper complied, fearing either a civil injunction or criminal
proceedings under the Official Secrets Act of 1989.  In any event, they
chose to destroy the documents rather than hand them over so as to
avoid any extraneous markings and also to avoid revealing the extent of
their catalogue.
If the obliteration of journalistic materials under threat of legal
action does not sound drastic enough, more legalistic coercion can
actually be invoked.  Again, this approach is not novel, and legal activi-
ties in connection with infractions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911–89
have already been noted.  But demands for information are becoming
firmly attached to counterterrorism operations, as revealed in two ways.
The first aspect concerns the use of special search powers in Sched-
ule 5 of the Terrorism Act of 2000—already mentioned as a possible
power, which might have been invoked in the Miranda case.154  Sched-
ule 5 offers variants upon production and search powers in relation to
potential evidence contained in Schedule 1 of the mainstream policing
legislation—namely, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
(“PACE”).  The main differences between the Terrorism Act powers
and the PACE powers are the triggering criteria, which relate to “terror-
ist investigations” rather than to specified criminal offences, and the
more extensive powers so triggered.  The catalogue includes powers to
enter premises, to search the premises or any person found there, and
to seize and retain any relevant material.  By Schedule 5, paragraph
1(1): “[a] constable may apply to a justice of the peace for the issue of a
warrant under this paragraph for the purposes of a terrorist investiga-
tion.”  The premises to be targeted may be particular—for a “specific
premises warrant”—or, following amendment by the Terrorism Act of
2006, section 26, they may comprise any or sets of premises occupied or
controlled by a person specified in the application—an “all premises
warrant.”155  “Excepted material” may not be the subject of an applica-
tion, and that term is defined in paragraph 4 by reference to corre-
sponding PACE exceptions.  These comprise “excluded material”
(under section 11 of PACE, which includes journalistic material which a
person holds in confidence and which consists of documents or of
records other than documents), “special procedure material” (under
section 14 of PACE, which includes all other journalistic material, other
than excluded material), and “items subject to legal privilege” (under
153. Julian Borger, NSA files: why the Guardian in London destroyed hard drives of leaked
files, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/
nsa-snowden-files-drives-destroyed-london.
154. See Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, sch. 5 (UK).
155. Id.; see Redknapp v. City of London Police [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1177 (indi-
cating that a warrant may incorporate both formats).
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section 10 of PACE).  Journalistic material is defined in section 13 of
PACE, as already described.156
In the light of these exceptions, the Terrorism Act of 2000’s search
powers have not been recorded as being used against journalists, but an
attempt to secure information from The Guardian and The Observer
about possible breaches of official secrets legislation was made in R v.
Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright.157  A decade and a half ago, the
judgment emphasized the value of journalism:
[P]remises are not to be entered by the forces of authority or the
State to deter or diminish, inhibit or stifle the exercise of an indi-
vidual’s right to free speech or the press of its freedom to investi-
gate and inform . . . .  Inconvenient or embarrassing revelations,
whether for the Security Services, or for public authorities, should
not be suppressed.158
More threatening is the next investigative power, under Schedule
5, paragraph 5, which deals with the production of, or access to—rather
than the physical search for—“excluded” and “special procedure”
materials.159  By paragraph 8, only legally privileged material is wholly
exempted from the clutches of paragraph 5.  By paragraph 5(1), a con-
stable may apply to a circuit judge for a production order to access
excluded or special procedure material—including, under paragraph
7, material coming into existence within 28 days—for the purposes of a
terrorist investigation.160  There is no requirement that notice be given
to the possessor of the materials or that the material must be potential
“evidence” for a court case.  If granted, the order may require under
paragraph 5(3), normally within seven days, a specified person: (a) to
produce to a constable within a specified period for seizure and reten-
tion any relevant material; (b) to give a constable access to relevant
material within a specified period; and (c) to state to the best of his
knowledge and belief the location of relevant material if it is not in, and
will not come into, his possession, custody, or power within the period
specified under (a) or (b).  An order may also require any other person
who appears to the judge to be entitled to grant entry to the premises to
allow entry and access.161  The circuit judge may grant an order if the
request “satisfies” two conditions in paragraph 6.  The first condition
relates to the relevance to the purposes of a terrorist investigation, as
well as the need for “reasonable grounds for believing that the material
is likely to be of substantial value.”  The second condition demands rea-
sonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest that the
material should be produced.  Under paragraph 10, the order is treated
156. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60 (UK).
157. R v. Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright [2000] EWHC 560.
158. Id. ¶¶ 97–98.
159. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 154.
160. Id. at 5(1).
161. Id. at 5(3).
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as if it were an order of the Crown Court and can be enforced by con-
tempt of court powers.162
Much of the litigation arising from Schedule 5, paragraph 5 has
related to journalistic materials.163  In R v. Middlesex Guildhall Crown
Court, ex parte Salinger & Anor,164 the police sought to obtain from the
prominent U.S. journalist, Pierre Salinger, and his media employers,
records of interviews conducted in Libya with the two prime suspects of
the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.  On the initial ex parte application, the
High Court held that the police should provide to the judge a written
statement of the material evidence, including the nature of the availa-
ble information subject to secrecy and sensitivity, and the applicant
police officer should appear before the judge to provide oral evidence.
The judge could then decide on the grant of the order and also on
what information might be served on the recipients.  In turn, the recipi-
ents will rarely be notified until the service of the order,165 when they
are entitled to be given, preferably in writing, as much information as
could properly be provided as to the grounds for the order; however, it
is rarely appropriate or necessary for disclosure of the source or details.
Their subsequent application to discharge or vary should be made to
the same judge with the same police officer who gave oral evidence
being present.  On this application, the judge can reconsider the order
afresh on its merits, and there is no onus on the recipient to satisfy the
judge that the order was wrongly made.  It was later revealed that ABC
News had agreed to comply because the order did not require the dis-
closure of confidential sources.166
Journalistic material was again investigated in 1991 when Box Pro-
ductions compiled a television programme, broadcast by Channel 4.  It
alleged collusion between members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
and Loyalist terrorists, which was presided over by a secret committee of
prominent people in Northern Ireland.  The police sought the produc-
tion of documents connected with the programme.  A redacted dossier
of material was handed over, but it was claimed that further sensitive
material had either been destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction
and that the only person who knew the whereabouts of the material was
a researcher employed by Box Productions.  The judge then directed
that the material sent abroad should be brought back and produced to
the police.  The respondents refused to comply.  The Divisional Court,
which could not review the judge’s order, imposed a fine of £75,000 for
contempt.167
162. Id. at 6 (2); see also Criminal Procedure Rules 2013, SI 2013/1554, §§ 6.6, 6.7,
6.13. Ex parte hearings may arise under §§ 6.3(3), 6.12.
163. See also In re Request from the United Kingdom, 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013).
164. R v. Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court, ex parte Salinger & Anor [1993] QB
564.
165. See also Re Morris [2003] NICC 11.  But appearance might be allowed in diffi-
cult and complex cases involving the media. Id. at ¶ 35.
166. See W.E. Schmidt, British TV Station Defies Order to Identify Source, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3,1992, at 10.
167. See generally DPP v. Channel 4 & Box Productions [1993] 2 All ER 517. See also
R. Costigan, Further Dispatches, 142 NEW L. J. 1417 (1992); S. MCPHILEMEY, THE COMMITTEE
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Next, in Re Moloney’s Application,168 the Northern Ireland editor of
the Sunday Tribune newspaper was required to produce notes of an
interview with William Stobie, who was later accused of the murder of a
prominent lawyer, Patrick Finucane.169  Quashing the Recorder’s
order, the High Court stated, “[t]he police have in our view to show
something more than a possibility that the material will be of some use.
They must establish that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the
investigation.”170
In Re Jordan,171 the police sought materials from a BBC Panorama
programme, Gangsters at War, which transmitted an announcement by a
masked man on behalf of the Ulster Freedom Fighters.  He was identi-
fied through voice analysis as Dennis Cunningham.172  Any arguments
about the chilling effect of disclosure on the ability to carry out investi-
gative journalism were outweighed in the view of the Crown Court in
Belfast by “the unmasking of terrorists and bringing them to justice.”173
By contrast, the BBC escaped compulsory disclosure by the Belfast
Recorder’s Court of un-broadcast film of a Republican parade in
Londonderry in 2011 in which a masked man read out a speech on
behalf of the Real IRA.174  The police’s claim that the extra footage
would aid identification was rejected under Schedule 5, paragraph 5,
because no “substantial value” had been established by the police.
However, the court made clear that if the police had met the standard
of proof, the public interest would have outweighed claims by the
media of increased risks in news-gathering.
In Malik v. Manchester Crown Court,175 a production order was
granted in relation to a book manuscript written about Hassan Butt,
entitled Leaving Al-Qaeda.  The police believed that the materials pos-
sessed by Malik, who helped to write the book, might disclose evidence
of crimes by Butt.  It was held that “likely,” paragraph 6(2)(b)
demanded a high standard—“probable”—but “substantial value”
required only a value more than minimal.176  Being “satisfied” required
a firm belief rather than a suspicion.177  On review, the grant of the
order was upheld, though the terms were altered.  The High Court indi-
cated that a court could, of its own motion, appoint a special advocate
(Robert Rinehart ed., 1999); McPhilemy v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] EWCA (Civ)
933 (Eng.).
168. Re Moloney’s Application [2000] NIJB (Civ) 195, (N. Ir.).
169. See Sir D. de Silva, REPORT OF THE PATRICK FINUCANE REVIEW, 2012, HC 802
(UK).
170. Re Moloney’s Application [2000] NIJB at 207.
171. Re Jordan [2003] NICC 17 (N. Ir.).
172. See R v. Cunningham [2005] NICC 45 (N. Ir.) (regarding the conviction of
Dennis Cunningham).
173. Re Jordan [2003] NICC 17, ¶ 1 (N. Ir.).
174. See BBC v. PSNI [2012] NICty 1 (N. Ir.).
175. Malik v. Manchester Crown Court [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1362.
176. See id. at ¶ 36.
177. See id. at ¶ 37.
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to appear at the ex parte hearing or on an application for variation or
discharge, but only in exceptional cases.178
In Re Galloway, the Police Service of Northern Ireland sought
records and materials from the Northern Editor of the Sunday Tribune
newspaper relating to claims of responsibility for the murders by
Republican dissidents of two soldiers in 2009.179  The application was
refused.  The Court endorsed the approach that the public interest in
the investigation and prosecution of serious crime is important, so the
level of proof of overriding interests must attain a very high threshold
of a substantial risk—in this case, the threat to the right to life (Article 2
of the Convention) of the journalist and her family.  In that case, the
journalist met the standard.180
Two issues have not yet been adequately litigated.  The first
involves whether compliance with the production order might involve
forcible self-incrimination contrary to Article 6 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.  It was indicated in R v. Central Criminal
Court, ex parte Bright that the statutory powers of production override
any right against self-incrimination.181  Equally, claims under Article 6
were dismissed in Beghal, as already indicated.182  The production of
physical materials with an existence independent of the will of the
defendant has been treated in the jurisprudence of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights as distinct from demanding information
from the knowledge of the defendant.183
The second factor to be further explored is the impact of section
12(4) of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which requires “particular
regard” for the importance of freedom of expression before any order
is granted.  Section 12 was enacted to “tip the balance” in favour of
expression.184  Its weighting has not yet made any impact in any of the
cases cited above.
Should a production order under paragraph 5 of the Terrorism
Act 2000 be viewed as inappropriate for the purposes of the investiga-
tion, a constable may apply to a circuit judge—or in Northern Ireland,
a Crown Court judge—under paragraph 11 for the issuance of a war-
rant to permit entry, search, and seizure.185  This variant procedure
may be selected where, under paragraph 12, a circuit judge is satisfied
that a production order has not been complied with, or where he is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing there is mate-
rial likely to be of substantial value, but that it is not appropriate to
178. See id. at ¶ 99.
179. See generally Re Galloway [2009] NICty 8 (N. Ir.).
180. Id. at ¶ 8.
181. R v. Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright, [2000] EWHC (QB) 662 (Eng.).
182. Beghal v. DPP [2015] UKSC 49 (appeal taken from Gr. Brit.).
183. See O’Halloran v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2008).
184. Human Rights Act, supra note 68. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 68, at
¶ 15.22. See also Stephen Tierney, Press Freedom and Public Interest: The Developing Jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 419 (1998).
185. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 154, at 12.
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proceed by way of production order—perhaps because it would tip off a
potential collaborator.186
Another type of investigative power is ancillary to the foregoing.
Pursuant to Schedule 5, paragraph 13, a constable may apply to a cir-
cuit judge—or in Northern Ireland, a Crown Court judge—for an
order requiring any person specified in the order to provide an expla-
nation of any material seized, produced, or made available under
paragraphs 1, 5, or 11.187  There is no immunity against revealing infor-
mation concerning other excepted materials, nor is there any
equivalent to this invasive power in PACE 1984.  It is an offence under
paragraph 14 to knowingly or recklessly make a false or misleading
statement.  By paragraph 13(4)(b), and in deference to Article 6, a
statement in response to a requirement imposed by an order under this
paragraph may be used in evidence against the maker only in a prosecu-
tion for an offense under paragraph 14, but not for other offenses.188
There is no recorded use against a journalist.
The increasing usage of Schedule 5 reveals an official willingness to
treat journalism as an available resource for the provision of journalistic
information in pursuit of criminal justice or terrorism investigation pur-
poses, but without much emphasis—beyond that stated in ex parte Bright
in 2001—on other public interests such as a free and fearless press.
The relative success of the tactic seems to have emboldened the police,
especially in Northern Ireland, and so this second tactic of confronta-
tion of journalism is now being rolled out on a global scale.  This new
front has become more feasible after 9/11, when the tendency to treat
terrorism cases as “political offenses” and therefore not subject to inter-
national comity has tended to fade away, especially on the part of the
U.S. authorities.189  The point is illustrated by litigation around the Bos-
ton College tapes that will now be described.190
The “Belfast Project” began in 2001 as an oral history of the North-
ern Ireland Troubles.  It was directed by journalist Ed Moloney, with
the fieldwork being conducted by Wilson McArthur, for Loyalists, and
Anthony McIntyre, for Republicans.  The collection was to form a
repository in the Burns Library at Boston College, thereby benefiting
from full U.S. First Amendment rights and a degree of distance, so it
186. Id.
187. See Criminal Procedure Rules 2013, §§ 6.8, 6.13.
188. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, App No. 19187/91, 1996-VI; I.J.L v. United
Kingdom, App Nos. 29522/95, 30056/96, 30574/96, 2000-IX.
189. For changing attitudes regarding extradition, see GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNA-
TIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS,
ch. 6 (1998); CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW 253?296 (2011).
190. See generally The Belfast Project, Boston College, and a Sealed Subpoena, BCSN
(2015), https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com; Beth McMurtrie, Secrets from Bel-
fast, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 26, 2014), http://chronicle.com/interactives/
belfast; Script of The Good Friday Agreement, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/gerry-adams-ireland-good-friday-agreement-scott-pelley-60-min-
utes/; Fraser Sampson, “Whatever You Say. . .”: The Case of the Boston College Tapes and How
Confidentiality Agreements Cannot Put Relevant Data Beyond the Reach of Criminal Investigation,
POLICING (2015).
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was thought, from the prying eyes of the British authorities.  A key
objective was to capture the views of live participants as a research
resource and also as part of the eventual process of transitional justice
through account-giving.  Various former Loyalist and Republican
paramilitaries gave candid interviews that chronicled their involvement
in the Troubles.  They were promised that the recordings and tran-
scripts would only be made public after their deaths.  Amongst those
interviewed were David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist Party, and
the former IRA commander Brendan Hughes—who died in 2007 and
2008 respectively—and some details were revealed in a book by Ed
Moloney191 and a television documentary broadcast by Raidio´ Teilifı´s
E´ireann in 2010.192  It was probably naı¨ve, arrogant, or both to suppose
that the authorities would look the other way.  Accordingly, the Police
Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) took action, after hearing claims
in the published statements of Hughes that the Sinn Fe´in leader, Gerry
Adams, had been overall commander of the IRA’s Belfast brigade and
that he had been involved in a unit responsible for the “Disappeared”—
those who were kidnapped, murdered and secretly buried by the
IRA.193  Though denied by Adams, another prominent Republican par-
ticipant in the “Belfast Project,” Dolours Price, who died in 2013, also
gave information about her involvement in driving one of the “Disap-
peared,” Jean McConville, to the place where the IRA murdered her in
1972.194
In March 2011, the PSNI began a legal bid in the U.S. to gain
access to the interviews held by Boston College.  Its investigation took
the form of a request to the U.S. Department of Justice to initiate
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty proceedings by issuing a sealed sub-
poena for all materials relating to two interviews in the archive, those of
Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price.195  Boston College sought to
quash the subpoena.196  In August 2011, a second subpoena was served
seeking “any and all interviews containing information about the
abduction and death of Mrs. Jean McConville.”197  This was also
opposed by the Belfast Project, including on the political argument that
the Attorney General “should take cognisance of solemn promises
made by the U.K. Government to the U.S. Senate that it would not reo-
191. ED MOLONEY, VOICES FROM THE GRAVE: TWO MEN’S WAR IN IRELAND (Faber &
Faber eds., 2010).
192. Broadcasting Authority of Ireland and Radio Telefis Eireann, Voices From The
Grave, BCSN (2010), https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/supporting-docu-
ments/voices-from-the-grave-documentary/.
193. See Northern Ireland (Location of Victims Remains) Act 1999, ch. 7, §§1–7; see
also INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE LOCATION OF VICTIMS REMAINS, http://www
.iclvr.ie/.
194. In August 2003, her remains were found by chance at Shelling Hill beach in
County Louth.  The IRA admitted her killing in 1999.
195. See Brief for the Petitioner in Supp,, Moloney & McIntyre v. Holder  (D. Mass.
2011) (r).
196. Id.
197. See Brief for the Petitioner in Supp. (Second Subpoena), Moloney & McIntyre
v. Holder  (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 11-MC-91078).
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pen issues addressed in the Belfast Agreement, or [ ] impede any fur-
ther efforts to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland.”198
In December 2011, Judge William G. Young recognised that “sub-
poenae targeting confidential academic information deserve height-
ened scrutiny,” but still ruled against both Boston College’s motions to
quash the subpoenas and Moloney and McIntyre’s motion to inter-
vene.199  His proposal was to review the archives in camera, but this exer-
cise was stayed pending an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals.200  The
First Circuit Court of Appeals gave judgment on the first subpoena on 6
July 2013, upholding Judge Young’s ruling.201  Any First Amendment
challenge was rejected on grounds that there were no private rights
under these international law arrangements and there was no judicial
review of actions under a treaty.  A stay was granted by the U.S.
Supreme Court,202 but certiorari was denied in 2013.203  The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled on Boston College’s appeal and motions on
31 May, 2013.  The court was critical of the breadth of the application
and reduced the amount of material to be handed over from 85 inter-
views—out of 176 relevant interviews in total—to segments of 11 inter-
views.204  But, at the same time, it crucially found that a promise of
confidentiality by a researcher did not create a First Amendment
bar.205  The U.S. Attorney’s application for a rehearing was denied.206
In early 2015, arrangements were made for sealed tapes to be sent
to the Royal Courts of Justice in Belfast.  Several legal consequences
have ensued.  First, Richard O’Rawe threatened to sue Boston College
after it handed over parts of his interviews. He claimed breach of
contract:
Mr O’Rawe told of his career in the Provos to Boston College
researchers on strict conditions contained in a ‘donor contract’
with the college.  It stated that ‘access to the tapes and transcripts
shall be restricted until after my death except in those cases where
I have provided prior written approval.’  However, the contract
didn’t specify that the secrecy of the archive was limited under
American law.207
198. See Intervenors’/Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Writ of Man-
damus and Injunctive Relief, Moloney & McIntyre v. Holder  (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 11-MC-
991078).
199. See United States v. Trustees of Boston College, 831 F. Supp. 2d 435, 455 (D.
Mass. 2011).
200. See Brief for Appellant, United States v. Trustees of Boston College, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 435 (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 12-1236).
201. See generally United States v. Moloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
202. See Moloney v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
203. See Moloney v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1796 (2013).
204. Compare United States v. Trustees of Boston College, 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir.
2013) with United States v. Trustees of Boston College, No. 11-91078-WGY, 2012 WL
194432 (D. Mass. 2012)
205. 718 F.3d at 20.
206. See United States v. Trustees of Boston College (In re Price), No. 12-1236 (1st
Cir. 2013) (order denying petition for rehearing).
207. Liam Clarke, Ex-IRA prisoner Richard O’Rawe: I’ll sue Boston College for handing
over tapes, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2014), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/
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Relevant materials were subsequently returned by Boston College
to O’Rawe, who destroyed them, but some materials were still disclosed
to the PSNI.208
Second, and even before the tapes had arrived, the police arrested
Gerry Adams in May 2014 regarding his alleged role in the disappear-
ance of Jean McConville.  Adams was released without charge, and the
then PSNI Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, rejected the “claim there
were ‘dark’ elements opposed to the peace process behind his deten-
tion.”209  While Adams was not pursued, Ivor Bell was charged with IRA
membership and aiding and abetting in the 1972 murder of Jean
McConville, with part of the evidence being derived from the tapes.210
Third, and with the tapes now arriving on the doorstep of the
United Kingdom jurisdiction, a number of interviewees began to con-
sider their uncomfortable position.  One such interviewee is Winston
Rea, who was a member of the Red Hand Commando and who had
provided testimony to the Belfast Project.  Rea brought legal proceed-
ings in Belfast to stop police from listening to the tapes.  His counsel
argued that prosecuting authorities were acting on a hunch rather than
any firm knowledge that the tapes contain information relevant to any
investigation and that the operative legislation, section 7(5) of the
Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, breached Rea’s right to
privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights, article 8.
After the application was rejected in the High Court, the PSNI officers
travelled to Boston for the purpose of taking possession of the tapes.  In
February 27, 2015, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal rejected the
appeal.211  The DPP argued that the standard to be established was sim-
ply that the evidence should be “for use” in the proceedings or investi-
gation rather than that it must be of “substantial value.”212  Given that
the legal test applied by the United States in such cases was that of
“probable cause,” the US Court of Appeals decision showed that suffi-
cient grounds were made out for the material to be subpoenaed.213
The DPP also argued that there was a duty to protect life under Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to investigate murder
northern-ireland/exira-prisoner-richard-orawe-ill-sue-boston-college-for-handing-over-
tapes-30267265.html.
208. Liam Clarke, Boston College tapes: Archive that turned into a can of worms, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2014), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/
boston-college-tapes-archive-that-turned-into-a-can-of-worms-30267260.html.
209. Henry McDonald, Gerry Adams Arrest Defended by Northern Ireland Police Chief,
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (May 6, 2014).  The quote is from Sinn Fe´in MP, and Deputy First
Minister of Northern Ireland, Martin McGuinness.
210. See Alan Erwin, Jean McConville: Former IRA man Ivor Bell charged with aiding and
abetting murder is granted High Court bail, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www
.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/jean-mcconville-former-ira-man-ivor-bell-
charged-with-aiding-and-abetting-murder-is-granted-high-court-bail-30127724.html; see
also Alan Erwin, Lawyers for Jean Accused Bid to Get Case Thrown Out, BELFAST TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 20, 2015).
211. See In Rea (Winston Churchill) [2015] NICA (Civ) 8 (N. Ir.).
212. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11.
213. See id. at ¶ 10.
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in the interests of victims and the general public.214  Lord Justice Cogh-
lin accepted that the material could properly be subpoenaed in connec-
tion with the investigation stage and that, as a consequence, the PSNI
do not have to identify specific aspects of the recordings which are rele-
vant to the offences being investigated, other than they purport to be
an account of terrorist activities carried out by the Red Hand Com-
mando of which the PSNI hold prior information, as noted in the letter
of request to American authorities indicating that Rea was an active
member.215  The standard specified in the 2003 Act for the grounds
upon which the evidence is considered to be relevant for the purpose of
a request for mutual assistance is that it is for “use in the proceedings or
investigation.”216  Such evidence could not be of use if it was irrelevant
but that was very far from reading into the 2003 Act any particular stan-
dard of relevance.  Finally, any infringement of privacy would be cov-
ered by the exceptions in Article 8(2) to the European Convention on
Human Rights.  Though the judgment was decisively in their favour,
before the PSNI could take away the tapes, the court ordered that the
material remained sealed pending an appeal to the United Kingdom
Supreme Court.217  The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal on
May 19, 2015,218 and the European Court of Human Rights also
refused to grant an interim prohibition.219  In June 2015, Lord Justice
Coghlin declared that “[t]he time has come for us to lift the injunction
and allow the materials to be examined by the police.”220
In conclusion, this second round of intrusions into journalistic
activities in order to support police and prosecution activities again
have the tendencies to downplay the wider public interest attributes of
journalism and also produce a chilling effect on the journalists and
their sources.  The only silver lining compared to the first round of
intrusions, and the third round to follow, is that the courts tend to be
heavily involved in the supervision of these interventions.  As a result,
while savings for journalistic purposes are often absent from the opera-
tive legal texts, the judges are alert to the issues under the European
Convention on Human Rights, though, as shown in the Boston Project
cases, the standards derived from that text are relatively weak, albeit
that apparently stronger standards on free speech under the U.S. Con-
stitution did not make much difference.
214. See id.
215. See id. at ¶ 14.
216. Id. at ¶ 22.
217. Id. at ¶ 25.
218. Permission to appeal decisions by UK Supreme Court, THE SUPREME COURT (May 19,
2015), https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-decisions-19-may-2015
.html.
219. Alan Erwin, Boston College tapes: PSNI wins access to Winston “Winkie” Rea after
court rejects final blocking bid, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (June 6, 2015), http://www.belfast-
telegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/boston-college-tapes-psni-wins-access-to-winston-
winkie-rea-after-court-rejects-final-blocking-bid-31280987.html.
220. Id.
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IV. DUTY TO INFORM PROACTIVELY
The foregoing mode of imposition upon journalism in the inter-
ests of counterterrorism demands action at the behest of the police.
This third mode of imposition seeks to bypass the need for any police
initiative.  After all, why should journalists wait for a call if their infor-
mation can save lives and if the police are unaware who possesses opera-
tive information in order to make a request?  Better still to confer a
general legal duty on everyone to inform without asking.  Such a gen-
eral duty would have particular purchase on journalism by recognising
the forensic abilities of some journalists to obtain and analyse informa-
tion that may sometimes exceed police capabilities in several ways.
First, journalists may be able to carry out investigations not permissible
by the police because of threshold requirements as to action or limita-
tions on investigative techniques.  Second, journalistic activity may be
unencumbered by the finances of the police in an age of austerity.221
Third, as illustrated by the Boston Project, some sources may be more
willing to speak with journalists than with police officers.  Consequently,
the objective under this third heading is to make journalists duty-bound
to serve up proactively information about terrorism and not simply act
as potential but passive, and perhaps hostile, resources for search war-
rants or other forms of police-initiated investigation.  The media must
therefore turn themselves into self-tasking policing bodies.
The Terrorism Act 2000, section 38B, has conferred this insidious
duty.222  An offence is committed under section 38B(2) if a person,
without reasonable excuse, fails to disclose information falling within
section 38B(1), which is information which he knows or believes might
be of material assistance in preventing the commission by another per-
son of an act of terrorism, or in securing the apprehension, prosecu-
tion, or conviction of another person, in the United Kingdom, for an
offence involving the commission, preparation, or instigation of an act
of terrorism.223  This special duty has existed in various guises since
1976, while in Northern Ireland it is also an offence under section 5 in
the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 to fail to give informa-
tion known or believed likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in
securing, the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person
for an arrestable offence which has been committed.224  Section 38B is
different in that the information must relate to “terrorism” rather than
an “arrestable offence” and may concern future as well as past activities.
Nevertheless, the considerable overlap between section 38B and section
221. See generally Clive Walker & Andrew Staniforth, The Amplification and Melding of
Counter-Terrorism Agencies: From Security Services to Police and Back Again, COUNTER-TERROR-
ISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: CROSSING LEGAL BOUNDARIES IN DEFENCE OF
THE STATE 293 (Aniceto Masferrer & Clive Walker eds., 2013).
222. See Clive Walker, Conscripting the Public in Terrorism Policing: Towards Safer Com-
munities or a Police State?, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 441, 443; CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE
TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 124–31 (2d ed. 2009).
223. See id.
224. Criminal Law Act 1967, c., § 18 (N. Ir.).
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5(1) convinced the Baker Report to propose the repeal of section 5(1)
as applied to “terrorist” offences.225
By section 38B(4), it is a defence for a person charged with an
offence to prove a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.
The defence of reasonable excuse will often relate to fears of reprisal or
reaction going beyond the defence of duress.226  Do journalists have a
“reasonable excuse” to disregard this legal duty?  A reporter may dis-
cover information about terrorism by interviewing a terrorist leader or
by witnessing a paramilitary display.  Arranging, attending, or reporting
such events may implicate the journalist in various offences—especially
attending a place of training under the Terrorism Act 2006, section 8—
but section 38B can involve two further impacts.  First, the offence con-
tributes to a “chilling” effect on the reporting of terrorism.  Correspon-
dents can expect close attention from the police and hostility and
special restrictions from their own superiors.  Thus, coverage of Irish
terrorism abounded with difficulties and was to some extent suppressed
as “guilty secrets.”227  The second effect is the direct threat of prosecu-
tion where insufficient weight is given in section 38B to investigative
journalism.228  Such a threat occurred in 1979 and related to a BBC
interview with an INLA representative and then the filming, but not the
transmission, of an IRA roadblock in Carrickmore.  Both events
incurred the wrath of the Attorney-General, who issued a warning to
the BBC on the 20 June 1980 that the incidents were of a nature “as
constituting in principle offences . . . .”229  Despite the threat, no prose-
cution has ensued.
There is no express exception for the media under section 38B,
but the coercion or subsequent sanctioning of journalists is subject to
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which applies
two restraints.  The more general is that the highest priority is given to
the encouragement of journalism involving political speech.230  The
second aspect of protection is against legal incursions that demand the
revelation of sensitive journalistic sources or confidences.231
In summary, despite the untrammelled breadth of its terms, some
restraint has been applied in the usage of section 38B.  It serves as a
threat rather than the basis for making martyrs out of journalists who,
on the evidence of the contempt cases arising from schedule 5 may not
be easily convinced to divulge source material.  However, the looming
threat of prosecution certainly shifts the balance of power in the gener-
ally cooperative relations between media and police described earlier.
225. SIR GEORGE G. BAKER, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND
(EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1978  ¶ 253 (1984).
226. See R v. Sherif et al. [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2653 (Eng.).
227. LIZ CURTIS, IRELAND: THE PROPAGANDA WAR 275 (1984).
228. See WALKER, supra note 43 at 141–43.
229. THE TIMES, August 2, 1980, at 2; see also CURTIS, supra note 227, at 169–70.
230. See Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445 (1992).
231. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No.17488/90, 22 Eur. H. R. 123, ¶ 39
(1996).
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Section 38B was devised in the days of the IRA, when, geographi-
cally and tactically, a more confined conflict was played out between
contestants who deeply understood each other.  Now, the perception is
of “new” terrorism,232 which applies such global savagery that the old
restraints of section 38B may also appear outmoded and weak.  Another
factor to take into account is the prolific storage and dissemination of
data through the internet.  As a result, there is increasing pressure on
communication service providers both to impose restraints on their cus-
tomers and also to keep the security authorities well informed about
nefarious customer activities.  Furthermore, these duties are very
broadly pitched to apply not just to intelligence about offences or
potential offences, but more generally to extremism and radicalization.
These extraordinary demands, which have not been imposed so
much on other media, were made explicit in the United Kingdom in
connection with the murder in Woolwich, South London, of Lee Rigby,
a British Army soldier, on 22 May 2013.  Those convicted of the mur-
der, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, drove their car at him
and then attempted to behead him.233  It emerged that Adebolajo had
been detained under the Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 7, after depor-
tation on security grounds from Kenya in 2010 but that no further
action was taken other than, allegedly, to recruit him as an inform-
ant.234  Aside from these convictions, much of the focus of subsequent
inquiries has concentrated on whether the murder could have been
prevented, and two candidate organizations were put under the spot-
light—the security agencies and the communications service providers.
Perhaps surprisingly, much more blame has been attached to the latter
than the former.235
The Prime Minister formed an Extremism Task Force after the kill-
ing of Lee Rigby, reported in late 2013.236  One of its findings was that
“[e]xtremist propaganda is too widely available, particularly online, and
has a direct impact on radicalising individuals.  The poisonous
messages of extremists must not be allowed to drown out the voices of
the moderate majority.”237  The Extremism Task Force agreed to:
• work with internet companies to restrict access to terrorist mate-
rial online which is hosted overseas but illegal under UK law
• improve the process for public reporting of extremist content
online
232. See generally BRYNJAR LIA, GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM
(2005); PETER R. NEUMANN, OLD & NEW TERRORISM (2009).
233. See R v. Adebolajo [2014] EWCA (Crim) 2779 (Eng.); Sean O’Neill, Muslim
converts guilty of murdering Fusilier Lee Rigby, THE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.the-
times.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3953546.ece.
234. See Lee Rigby murder: What MI5 knew about Woolwich killers, BBC (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-30196703.
235. See, e.g., Claire Phipps, Lee Rigby report: Facebook accused of failing to flag extremist
messages—as it happened, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/live/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-woolwich-inquiry-report-published-live-coverage.
236. See CABINET OFFICE, TACKLING EXTREMISM IN THE UK: REPORT FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER’S TASK FORCE ON TACKING RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 1 (2013).
237. Id. at 3.
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• work with the internet industry to help them in their continuing
efforts to identify extremist content to include in family-friendly
filters
• look at using existing powers to exclude from the UK those who
post extremist material online who are based overseas.238
Next, the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report on the Intelli-
gence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby found that the security
services investigated these individuals on several occasions, but nothing
immediately threatening to life had turned up.239  The agencies knew
of their extremism and wanted to use them as informants, especially as
they could be pressured as a result of involvement in drug dealing.  In
short, the agencies acted properly within the resources available—a
finding similar to the inquiries into the July 7, 2005 London bomb-
ings,240 even though it was clear that the Woolwich pair were of much
higher profile than the 7/7 group.  However, the Intelligence and
Security Committee does criticize the security agencies in some
respects: stronger alarm bells should ring when an individual recur-
rently becomes of interest, and the Security Intelligence Service must
be more proactive and take a greater interest in the activities of cooper-
ating foreign agencies, including allegations of misconduct.241  Yet, the
most trenchant criticism is made of the failure of internet companies,
especially the unnamed Facebook, for their failure to be more forth-
coming in terms of alerting the authorities.242
Much of the subsequent media and political attention concen-
trated on the behaviour of Facebook.  Several of Michael Adebowale’s
multiple social media internet accounts were closed proactively by
Facebook and without official request because the accounts “hit triggers
. . . related to their criteria for closing things down on the basis of ter-
rorist content.”243  Facebook also learned, on completion of a retro-
spective review of all his 11 accounts,244 that Adebowale had discussed
“in the most explicit and emotive manner” over Facebook’s instant mes-
saging service his desire to murder a soldier.245  The ISC was neverthe-
less critical of monitoring procedures by CSPs,246 though serial
investigations by the Security Service were excused as sufficiently thor-
ough, especially because, as pointed out by GCHQ, true intent can be
238. Id. at 3.
239. See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT, REPORT ON THE
INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE MURDER OF FUSILIER LEE RIGBY, 2014–15, HC 795, at
165–72 [hereinafter ISC REPORT].
240. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS
IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2005–06, HC 1087, at 26. See generally INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY COMMITTEE, COULD 7/7 HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?, 2009, Cm. 7617.
241. 25 Nov. 2914 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2014) col. 747 (UK), http://www.publi-
cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141125/debtext/141125-0001.htm.
242. Sean O’Neill et al., Rigby killer’s Facebook plot, THE TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http:/
/www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/technology/internet/article4278479.ece.
243. ISC REPORT, supra note 239, at 128.
244. See id. at 130.
245. Id. at 129.
246. See id.
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very difficult to discern from online communications.247  Thus, even if
Facebook had passed on the offending messages to the security agen-
cies, any reaction by them was far from assured and had been eschewed
on several previous occasions.  Though Facebook was not wholly forth-
coming, their default raises two further jurisdictional issues.  One is that
their activities, based in the US, are overseen by the US security agen-
cies; thus the Intelligence and Security Committee rather coyly referred
to a “partner” foreign agency, but without asking whether it knew what
was said on Facebook about killing a soldier and whether it consciously
failed to pass on that information to the British agencies.248  A second
jurisdictional point is that even in the case of clear default, any proac-
tive legal duty would have limited impact on a company based in the
United States and any attempt to subpoena information would be labo-
rious, as shown by the Boston Project case.
Taking up the last point, Sir Nigel Sheinwald was subsequently
appointed as Special Envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data
sharing in order to secure better transatlantic data sharing.249  His
report250 included some achievements from his dialogues in the United
States, which had helped to secure that the major social media internet
companies will act on the most urgent requests by treating selected UK
policing and security agencies as “trusted flaggers” so as to remove
materials, though “cooperation remains incomplete.”251  Sheinwald’s
longer-term proposals are built around both greater data sharing
between government agencies, though there is already very strong
cooperation between the UK and US through the “Five Eyes” arrange-
ments,252 and reform to mutual legal assistance treaties253 so that they
247. See id. at 130–32.
248. See id. at 131.
249. See Press Release, Cabinet Office et al., Sir Nigel Sheinwald Appointed Special
Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www
.gov.uk/government/news/sir-nigel-sheinwald-appointed-special-envoy-on-intelligence-
and-law-enforcement-data-sharing.
250. SIR NIGEL SHEINWALD, SUMMARY OF THE WORK OF THE PRIME MINISTER’S SPECIAL
ENVOY ON INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA SHARING (2015).
251. Id.; see also David Barrett, Google to deliver wrong ‘top’ search results to would-be
jihadis, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/
12136765/Google-to-deliver-wrong-search-results-to-would-be-jihadis.html; Hugh Handey-
side, Social Media Companies Should Decline the Government’s Invitation to Join the National
Security State, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/28755/social-
media-companies-decline-governments-invitation-join-national-security-state/; Jonathan
Zittrain, A Few Keystrokes Could Solve the Crime. Would You Press Enter?, JUST SECURITY (Jan.
12, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/28752/keystrokes-solve-crime-press-enter/.
252. British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement, U.K.-U.S., Mar. 5, 1946,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11536914; British-U.S. Communica-
tion Intelligence Agreement, U.K.-U.S. (June 26, 1951), https://www.nsa.gov/pub-
lic_info/_files/ukusa/ukusa_comint_agree.pdf; British-U.S. Communication Intelligence
Agreement, U.K.-U.S., May 10, 1955, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/
new_ukusa_agree_10may55.pdf. See Sir Stephen Lander, International Intelligence Coopera-
tion: An Inside Perspective, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 481, 491 (2004); Patrick F. Walsh
& Seumas Miller, Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post
Snowden, 31 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 345 (2015).
253. See Council Decision 2009/820/CFSP, 2009 O.J. (L 291) 40; Instrument as
Contemplated by Article 3 (2) of the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the
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become less “slow, unresponsive (it can take up to nine months for
information to be returned) and bureaucratic (it currently involves
hard copies of legal documents being couriered across the Atlantic
through numerous intermediary bodies).”254  Some of the envisaged
changes are merely technical and bureaucratic.  Much more ambitious
is the proposal by Sheinwald for a new international framework about
data sharing on counter-terrorism.  However, previous disputes over
trans-Atlantic data sharing in regard to terrorism indicate the extreme
difficulties of reaching such an agreement if it is to go beyond the rela-
tive informality of the existing “Five Eyes” arrangements.255
Putting aside other relevant issues around data privacy, accounta-
bility for surveillance, the duty of care to users, and the economic effi-
ciency, were social media companies to be legally obliged to proactively
monitor and share all postings of a violent extremist nature with the
security authorities, both would be deluged with information and ren-
dered unable to function on an economic basis.  Yet, the allure of blam-
ing a foreign internet company rather than home security agencies for
failing to avert atrocities seems to have been hard to resist in the U.K.
even though it is clear that the Woolwich murder revealed a failure of
assessment, perhaps understandable and excusable, rather than any
crucial lack of information.256
United States of America and the European Union signed 25 June 2003, as to the Applica-
tion of the Treaty Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.K.-U.S., Jan. 6, 2004.  See generally Sarah Cortes, MLAT
Jiu-Jitsu and Tor: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Surveillance, 22 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1
(2015); ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS (2015).
254. SHEINWALD, supra note 250, at 2.
255. See Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of
America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European
Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program,
Eur. Union-U.S., July 27, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 5 (a previous version having been
rejected by the European Parliament); Agreement between the European Union and the
United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security
13668/08, Oct. 8, 2006, Eur. Union-U.S., 2006 O.J. (L 298) 29; Annexes to Agreement
between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and
Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States
Department of Homeland Security 11304/07, June 28, 2007 (a previous version being
successfully challenged in Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council and
Commission 2006 E.C.R. I-04721); Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000
On the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and
Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce 2000
O.J. (L 215) 7 (EU) (as successfully challenged in Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot.
Comm’r). See generally, Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resh, Transatlantic Privacy Regula-
tion: Conflict and Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2015).
256. But see Hugo Rifkind, Google vs governments—let the new battle for free speech begin,
THE SPECTATOR (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/11/nerds-spies-and-
terrorists-the-online-battle-for-freedom-of-the-press/; James Forsyth, The technology giants
are breathtakingly irresponsible about terrorism, THE SPECTATOR (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www
.spectator.co.uk/2014/11/the-technology-giants-are-breaktakingly-irresponsible-about-
terrorism/.
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The head of the U.K. Security Service, Andrew Parker, kept up the
pressure in his first public speech in early January, 2015 by emphasizing
the need for powers to access and intercept communications.257  His
call was soon followed by the Government’s reply to the Intelligence
and Security Committee, which was adamant that:
Communications Services Providers (CSPs) have a responsibility
to ensure their networks are not used to plot terrorist attacks. . . .
[W]e are also pushing CSPs to take stronger, faster and further
action to combat the use of their services by terrorists, criminals
and their supporters.  They are committed to measures that make
it easier for their users and the authorities to report terrorist and
extremist propaganda.  We will build on this to encourage compa-
nies to work together to produce industry standards for the identi-
fication, removal and referral of terrorist activity.258
By contrast, the government expressed itself “confident that MI5 pri-
oritises available resources and deploys them proportionately to the
level of risk represented and as necessary to satisfactorily mitigate the
risk, based on the information known at the time.”259  Yet it seems, by
contrast, that CSPs are expected to perform to a higher duty of care
with no margin for error or discretion: “Communications Services Prov-
iders (CSPs) have a responsibility to ensure their networks are not used
to plot terrorist attacks.”260  A more realistic understanding is that even
with extensive criminal offences, intrusion into free speech activities,
the appointment of extra staff, and extra funding, not all terrorism will
be averted.  It is unrealistic to expect internet companies to act as better
all-seeing and all-doing state spies than the security agencies
themselves.
Despite these doubts, the tactic of imposing a duty to inform proac-
tively seems no longer to be a British obsession but is one that is seep-
ing into the U.S. psyche.  Though not backed by criminal sanction,
such as in section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000,261 the U.S. Congress
passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act at the end of 2015 to
“improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced sharing
of information about cybersecurity threats, and for other purposes.”262
The Act permits the sharing of internet traffic information between the
U.S. government and technology and manufacturing companies.263  As
257. See Andrew Parker, Director General, Security Service, Address to the Royal
United Services Institute at Thames House: Terrorism, Technology and Oversight (Jan. 8,
2015).
258. CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE MURDER OF FUSIL-
IER LEE RIGBY 5–6 (2015).
259. Id. at 7.
260. Id. at 5.
261. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 38B (U.K.).
262. S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).  The Act forms Division N of the Mili-
tary Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016.
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division N, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015).
263. See S. 754, 114th Cong. §§ 103, 105 (2015)
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mentioned, there is no compulsion to do so, but the sharing of per-
sonal information is authorised as a function of government, with the
Department of Homeland Security providing the conduit.  Further-
more, personal information may be used as evidence for crimes involv-
ing any “terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction” (under
section 105(d)(5)(A)(iv)).264  One Bill proposed around the same
time, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2015, would have
required analysis of how terrorists and terrorist organizations are using
social media.265  Another Bill, Requiring Reporting of Online Terrorist
Activity Act of 2015, went much further by demanding that
Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic communica-
tion service or a remote computing service to the public through a
facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, obtains actual
knowledge of any terrorist activity, including the facts or circum-
stances described in subsection (c), shall, as soon as reasonably
possible, provide to the appropriate authorities the facts or cir-
cumstances of the alleged terrorist activities.266
However, no sanction was specified for default, and Congress has not
enacted either Bill.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The modes of treating journalists either as akin to terrorists or in
some cases as akin to police officers are not new.  The history of
demands, threats, and prosecutions extends over several decades.  But
confrontational stances seem to be growing more prevalent and more
insistent.  Factors that might explain this trend have broadly been iden-
tified as reflecting two vectors.  One relates to the perceived nature of
terrorism.  The “new” terrorism is seen as more threatening and there-
fore demands greater societal mobilization and lower tolerance to risk.
As a result, counterterrorism is allowed to transcend other values,
including the expressive rights of journalists and the privacy rights of
their sources.  The other vector relates to the perceived nature of the
journalism and the media.  The official perception seems to be that the
media has grown more powerful as private actors and should therefore
be viewed as more potentially threatening to the public interests of
counter-terrorism.
Assuming that these trends of hostility to journalism are occurring,
what should be the reactions?  Some international law authorities have
expressed concern.  In particular, the UN Special Rapporteur on Free-
dom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the
Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to
264. Id. at § 105(d)(5)(A)(iv).
265. H.R. 3654, 114th Cong. (2015).
266. S. 2372, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
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Information issued a Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and Anti-
Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation in 2008 which proposed that:
The definition of terrorism, at least as it applies in the context of
restrictions on freedom of expression, should be restricted to vio-
lent crimes that are designed to advance an ideological, religious,
political or organised criminal cause and to influence public
authorities by inflicting terror on the public.
The criminalisation of speech relating to terrorism should be
restricted to instances of intentional incitement to terrorism,
understood as a direct call to engage in terrorism which is directly
responsible for increasing the likelihood of a terrorist act occur-
ring, or to actual participation in terrorist acts (for example by
directing them).  Vague notions such as providing communica-
tions support to terrorism or extremism, the ‘glorification’ or
‘promotion’ of terrorism or extremism, and the mere repetition
of statements by terrorists, which does not itself constitute incite-
ment, should not be criminalised.
The role of the media as a key vehicle for realising freedom
of expression and for informing the public should be respected in
anti-terrorism and anti-extremism laws.  The public has a right to
know about the perpetration of acts of terrorism, or attempts
thereat, and the media should not be penalised for providing such
information.
Normal rules on the protection of confidentiality of journal-
ists’ sources of information—including that this should be over-
ridden only by court order on the basis that access to the source is
necessary to protect an overriding public interest or private right
that cannot be protected by other means—should apply in the
context of anti-terrorist actions as at other times.267
A more recent statement of devotion is the European Union’s Human
Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression.268  Paragraph 31 states  “States
should protect by law the right of journalists not to disclose their
sources in order to ensure that journalists can report on matters in the
public interest without their sources fearing retribution.”269  Similar
sentiments are made in the paragraph regarding information and com-
munication technologies.270  Annex 1 recognises that “the protection
of national security can be misused to the detriment of freedom of
expression,” and so “States must take care to ensure that anti-terrorism
laws, treason laws or similar provisions relating to national security
(state secrets laws, sedition laws, etc.) are crafted and applied in a man-
267. Organization of American States, Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and
Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
expression/showarticle.asp?artID=735&lID=1.
268. Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of
Expression Online and Offline (May 12, 2014).
269. Id. at 7.
270. Id. at 9.
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ner that is in conformity with their obligations under international
human rights law.”271
By contrast to this soft law, harder-edged international law, such as
the already mentioned UN Security Resolution 2178,272 has pushed in
the opposite direction, and ideas around offering more protection to
journalists, including in conflict zones, have not been delivered.273
Turning to domestic safeguards, broad constitutional statements of
values, such as freedom of expression, have the virtues of coverage and
importance, but they also reflect limits.  Even the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution did not forbid the rendition of the Bos-
ton Project tapes and has also allowed the enforcement of material sup-
port offences.274  Likewise, Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights has proven relatively weak when challenged by opera-
tional requirements of counter terrorism.  Within the Human Rights
Act 1998, there is the further boost to freedom of expression given by
section 12 which was enacted to “tip the balance” in favour of expres-
sion.275  However, in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.,276 section 12(4) was not
interpreted as according to Article 10 as a presumptive priority over
other rights.277  Despite its uncertain impacts, section 12(4) has been
used as a precedent in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
section 31, for giving a special boost to freedom of speech in the appli-
cation of the “Prevent” duty (countering violent extremism) to
universities.278
In the light of these experiences, it would seem that if freedom of
expression is to be better safeguarded against counter terrorism, more
271. Id. at 16.
272. See U.N. Secretary General, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Protection of Journal-
ists Engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/10147 (Aug. 1,
1975).
273. See generally Emily Crawford & Kayt Davies, The International Protection of Journal-
ists in Times of Armed Conflict: The Campaign for a Press Emblem, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1 (2014);
Laura M.J. Fournier, The Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflict (2013–14) (unpublished
Master thesis of the ‘Master of Laws,’ Ghent University) (on file with Ghent University
Law School).
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996). See, e.g., United States
v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-01054
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2009); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). See
generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of
Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012); Adam Tomkins, Criminalizing Support for Terrorism: A
Comparative Perspective, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2011); David Cole, The First
Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment
Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & PUB. POL’Y REV. 147 (2012); George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism
Trial—Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of the Judge After United States
v. Mehanna, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J 1 (2012); Nikolas Abel, Note, United States v. Mehanna,
The First Amendment, and Material Support in the War on Terror, 54 B.C. L. REV. 711 (2013);
Emily Goldberg Knox, Note, The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: Social Media
Support to Terrorists, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 295 (2014).
275. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 15.22
(2d ed. 2009).
276. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2000] EWCA (Civ) 353, [2001] Q.B. 967 (Eng.).
277. See id. at 136.
278. See also J Blackbourn & Clive Walker, Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 79 MODERN L. REV. 840 (2016).
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specific and stronger savings must be inserted into specific policing and
court powers.  One precedent is the saving for excluded and special
procedure journalistic material under sections 11, 13, and 14 of
PACE.279  The same idea is now being advanced in relation in the inter-
ception of communications data under the Regulation of Interception
of Communications Act 2000.280  Even the Home Office’s revised Code
of Practice on Schedule 7 makes significant concessions to journalistic
materials.281  Special savings of this kind may, in practical terms,
require a higher threshold for intervention against journalistic materi-
als and/or may require a stricter level of authorization or supervision of
the intervention—such as a judicial warrant.  The same devices could
be applied more widely in counter-terrorism legislation and on a firmer
basis than by means of a code of practice.
For the foreseeable future, the value of counter-terrorism will con-
tinue to be played as a trump card against journalistic data and the
interests of free expression and free information in many societies.  The
trends now impinging on journalistic activities with reference to
counter-terrorism seem set to strengthen for now.
279. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, §§ 11, 13, & 14 (UK).
280. See INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, IOCCO
INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF CHAPTER 2 OF PART 1 OF THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY
POWERS ACT (RIPA) TO IDENTIFY JOURNALISTIC SOURCES (2015).
281. See HOME OFFICE, EXAMINING OFFICERS AND REVIEW OFFICES UNDER SCHEDULE 7
TO THE TERRORISM ACT 2000: CODE OF PRACTICE (2014).
